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Executive summary  
This paper presents a critical survey and meta-analysis of the South African academic 
literature on unemployment. It asks whether the research has produced a coherent analytical 
picture. Key elements of seminal contributions are summarised. A number of key themes 
and findings are identified, as are significant differences relating to subdisciplines but also to 
epistemology, method and technique (and ideology). 
It is demonstrated that the large number of research contributions on unemployment in 
South African can be clustered into a number of discourses signified by distinctive topics, 
approaches, vocabulary, models and data (inter alia). It shows that the South Africa 
unemployment ‘discourse landscape’ is spacious and varied, with many mountains and hills, 
some coherence, but also deep valleys/divides.  
Three major discourse ‘worlds’ – labour, poverty-development, and macro – are dis-
tinguished, with some sub-discourses. There is much evidence of researchers in particular 
discourses not engaging with research results produced in other discourses, and even being 
analytically blinkered by their home discourse. Debate occurs within the discourses, but not 
much between them. 
These divisions reflect numerous divisive factors intrinsic to the scientific process, as 
institutionalised by universities, research institutes, academic journals, funding agencies and 
policy-makers – but also by epistemological and ideological forces/preferences.  
As a result, to a large extent the insights produced by researchers in the different dis-
courses often are fragmented and disconnected – no complete coherent analytical picture or 
nuanced, encompassing diagnosis of the intrinsically complex problem of unemployment has 
been generated. Three (perhaps five) very different perspectives on unemployment prevail. 
Many gaps are apparent. Yet some key analytical insights central to a coherent analytical 
picture can be distilled: 
  The South African labour market is characterised by segmentation, informal-formal and 
rural-urban dualisms, and segmentation within the informal sector (alongside subsistence 
and survivalist sectors).  
  The nature of such multi-segmentation and of labour market linkages between segments 
– and factors enabling or disabling persons to transition to a better segment – may be 
critical to both unemployment and poverty.  
  A range of factors – information, entry and mobility barriers, inter alia due to the condition 
of poverty as well as marginalisation – structurally inhibit job searching and entry into 
labour markets both from a condition of poverty and from one segment to another. These 
factors intrinsically limit the reach and smoothness of the functioning of labour markets. 
  The issues cannot be separated I: One cannot analyse and understand South African 
unemployment without talking about segmentation and about the informal sector and 
about entry and mobility barriers and about the impact of poverty conditions and about 
marginalisation. Likewise, one cannot consider marginalisation and chronic poverty with-
out talking about labour markets and income generating activities. 
  The issues cannot be separated II:  One cannot analyse and understand unemployment 
in South Africa without dealing thoroughly with   
(a)  the real wage elasticity of the demand for labour (= approximately -0.7), in particular 
the likely positive versus negative impact, on employment, of wage decreases and 
increases respectively, and      3
(b) the output-elasticity of employment, in particular the important though constrained 
impact, on (un)employment, of formal sector growth, given a value of 0.5 (approx). 
  Pensions and social grants constitute a critical policy nexus that links poverty, 
marginalisation, inequality, labour supply, (un)employment and macro-fiscal issues. 
Complex incentive and disincentive effects may be present. 
  The impact of education on poverty, inequality and unemployment respectively may be 
dissimilar and complex. Education only appears to have a significant impact on 
(un)employment once working-age persons have a matric qualification or higher.  
  Gender, race, age and generational aspects influence, in complex ways, the causal 
relationships surrounding issues such as vulnerability, job search, migrancy, grants and 
education. These aspects need careful, nuanced analysis. 
  There are indications of a bidirectional causality between unemployment and poverty: 
unemployment causes poverty, but in turn the condition of poverty contributes to 
unemployment and its persistence. The implications of such a causality for policy to 
facilitate access of poor people to labour markets can be very important. This may 
contribute to the observed phenomenon of unemployment persistence (hysteresis). 
Such issues raise a number of important challenges to researchers and policy-advisers in 
the three sub-disciplines. For example: 
  Can a macroeconomic analysis of employment and unemployment proceed legitimately 
without engaging with, and incorporating, the search and access problems caused by 
poverty and various segmentations? 
  Can an analysis of growth, and constraints on growth, proceed without taking account of 
the implications of segmentation, poverty conditions and marginalisation for the assumed 
free flow of labour into a formal sector with flexible labour markets? 
  Can a growth-oriented employment analysis (or a growth strategy) proceed legitimately 
without dealing with the constrained employment-creation capacity of formal sector 
growth and the intrinsically-linked worlds of informal production and employment, various 
types of subsistence and survivalist activities? 
  Can a poverty-oriented analysis of unemployment and wages proceed legitimately 
without engaging with the presence, nature and implications of a negative wage elasticity 
of the demand for labour or the relative importance of formal sector growth? 
  Can labour unions continue to insist that macroeconomic policy measures should 
shoulder the burden of explaining and resolving unemployment (in conjunction with to 
industrial strategies to promote labour-intensive formal-sector manufacturing)? 
There also is the overarching question whether we adequately integrate the developing-
country context of South Africa into our analyses of unemployment and labour markets  
If such questions are not addressed, the South African unemployment debate is likely to 
continue to be intrinsically blinkered by separate discourses. It is highly unlikely that one 
discourse can provide the analytical insights and policy options necessary to lead to a 
significant reduction of unemployment (and poverty) in South Africa. 
The paper explore the outlines of a conversation towards an integrated understanding of 
the macroeconomic, labour market and developmental dimensions of unemployment. Such a 
rich integration of insights and models is essential for policy making in overarching 
departments (e.g. Treasury; Economic Development) and for the Executive (Cabinet).   4
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There would be little disagreement that unemployment, together with poverty and inequality, 
are the most important problems facing South Africa and the creation of a society that is 
socially, economically and politically sustainable. In 2010 official statistics put the narrowly-
defined unemployment rate at approximately 25% while one can estimate the broad rate at 
approximately 37%, having peaked at approximately 31% and 42.5% respectively in 2003.
1 
Large amounts of research have been published, involving prestigious universities, insti-
tutes and international organisations like the World Bank, the ILO and the IMF. Research 
activity regarding poverty, unemployment and inequality has received a boost during the past 
decade due to the availability of much better data from household surveys and government 
labour force surveys. Of particular importance has been the 1993 PSLSD household survey 
(mostly published in 2000/1), the various OHS, LFS and lately QLFS data sets from Statis-
tics SA, and most recently the NiDS panel data bank, managed by SALDRU.
2 
The question is where all this activity brings us regarding unemployment. It is common 
cause that meaningful inroads into unemployment have not been made. But do we have a 
coherent analytical picture of the issue? Exactly where is the debate on unemployment in 
South Africa? And, how should policy-makers deal with the various research findings? 
This paper addresses these questions. They are based on a wide-ranging critical survey 
and meta-analysis of the South African academic and research discourse on unemployment 
and poverty in the last 10-15 years. The focus is on underlying features of labour markets and 
unemployment in South Africa rather than specific episodes of unemployment changes. The 
survey involves approximately two hundred papers in relevant South African and 
international academic journals and working paper series. 
                                                 
1 Changing definitions have led to the official value for broad unemployment in 2010 ( 32.1%) being 
approximately 5% lower than what it would have been using the earlier definitions. 
2 PSLSD = Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development Survey, SALDRU and the 
World Bank, 1993 
OHS = October Household Survey, Statistics South Africa (1993-1999) 
LFS = Labour Force Survey, Statistics South Africa (2000-2007) 
QLFS = Quarterly Labour Force Survey, Statistics South Africa (since 2008) 
NiDS = National Income Dynamics Survey, SALDRU (since 2008) 
SALDRU = South African Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town 
DPRU = Development Policy Research Unit, University of Cape Town   7
Section 2 sets out the objectives and framework of the analysis. Sections 3 and 4 survey 
and analyse contributions relating to labour market analysis and then poverty, inequality and 
development analysis. Section 5 provides an overview and complete graphical depiction of 
the discourse, while section 6 provides a provisional analysis and conclusion with regard to 
the first two clusters. Section 7 and 8 discuss and analyse the macro/macro-sectoral cluster. 
Section 9 provides a diagram of the complete discourse landscape and an in-depth analysis 
of the complete landscape: the ‘three worlds’, glaring gaps, and factors that divide the 
discourse. Section 10 concludes with major conclusions distilled from all the discourses as 
well as emergent analytical and research challenges. 
 
2. OBJECTIVES AND FRAMEWORK 
2.1  Objectives 
 
The study reveals a great diversity of contributions, approaches, models, findings and policy 
recommendations.  
A first objective is to see whether the research contributions can be organized in a 
revealing way in terms of approach or characteristics and whether there are clusters which 
constitute different discourses. We develop a ‘google-earth’ view and diagram of the major 
features of the discourse ‘landscape’: mountains, valleys, rifts and faults, rivers and quag-
mires. 
A second objective is to distil key themes and findings and evaluate whether the research 
findings constitute a complete and coherent picture. A third objective is to identify differ-
ences, analyse factors that differentiate or fragment, and identify gaps and research chal-
lenges.  
For a long time the discourse focused on the definition, measurement and severity of 
unemployment in South Africa. This largely was a reaction to many decades of limited in-
formation on black unemployment and scepticism of official unemployment data, as well as 
the ideologically-laden discourse, in the 1980s, between free-market economists and others 
on whether unemployment in South Africa is voluntary or involuntary. Furthermore, as 
noted above, the 1990s saw several new labour and household surveys as part of government 
and university-based statistical efforts. Inconsistencies and complexities in these were a   8
major source of debate. Most of the issues appear to have been resolved, although not 
entirely.
3 It will not be considered here.  
Identifying, assessing and categorising the variety of research contributions reveals that 
several issues may both obscure and segregate this particular academic discourse. It is 
important to be alert to these, and relevant information will be noted throughout. 
 
2.2  Factors that may obscure and fragment  
 
First, there are the complex relationships between terms and overlapping phenomena such 
as unemployment, poverty, inequality and (under)development. There is disagreement on 
how they relate and which problem is most important. 
Secondly, employment and unemployment are at the very heart of the deepest and most 
emotive ideological divisions in 20
th and 21
st century society. These topics are well-worn bat-
tle grounds for intense debates between conservatives, liberals and neo-liberals, Marxists, 
neo-Marxists and post-Marxists, pro-business, pro-worker and pro-poor advocates, and 
recurring market-versus-state debates. Even the choice of a particular term or topic of study 
may be read as the adoption of a particular philosophical, ideological as well as disciplinary 
and analytical paradigm. Some terms and expressions often have strong ‘code word’ roles. 
Hence labelling – often intended to prevent thought – tend to occur quickly. 
Thirdly, various sub-disciplines of economics as well as other social sciences engage with 
unemployment and poverty, often in different ways: macroeconomics, labour economics, 
development economics, etc. and then also sociology, political science, anthropology, histo-
riography, and so forth. The malady of silo thinking in the sciences is a well-known phe-
nomenon. 
Fourthly, different epistemological, methodological, theoretical and technical traditions 
and frameworks are dominant in different (sub)disciplines, also delineating and fragmenting 
the discourse. Different data types and sources also complicate matters. Major battles have 
been fought on the gathering, reliability and interpretation of unemployment and poverty 
statistics. 
                                                 
3 For a brief tour, see Nattrass (2000); Klasen and Woolard (1999:2-7); Bhorat (1999); Kingdon and 
Knight (2000); Klasen (2000); Leibbrandt and Woolard (2001); Muller and Posel (2004); Simkins 
(2004); Du Toit (2007); Meth (2007; 2009); Altman (2008a); Yu (2010a; 2010b).    9
Fifthly, research activity occurs at selected locations, i.e. a specific research units, aca-
demic departments and other institutions – each with their own history, focus, approach, 
skills, paradigm and research ‘territory’. 
Sixthly, the location of published research outputs in different journals and working 
paper series displays a distinct pattern. This raises the question of the presence or absence of 
open academic discourse. 
Lastly, different government departments deal separately with the various issues. Each 
may have it own approach, programme, political leadership and territorial imperatives – and 
favourite research institute. 
An emerging question is whether one can at all forge an integrated or encompassing 
understanding of the contributions made by the various actors and approaches – where an 
integrated understanding may be essential for making impact on the conditions of poverty, 
inequality, unemployment and underdevelopment in South Africa. While individual re-
searchers or research institutes must have the academic freedom to focus on a specific angle, 
for the policy-maker there is no such luxury. No matter how much research work is available 
to dissect a problem, in the end the policy-maker must design and implement policy in a real 
world full of non-abstracted richness, complexity and messiness. This is particularly true for 
the fiscal authority (Treasury), where all government programmes come together in one 
budget, other departments with overarching responsibilities (e.g. the new Department of 
Economic Development) – and of course the central government executive (Cabinet). 
 
2.3  The discourse landscape: three clusters 
 
In a certain sense the landscape of topics is quite continuous. One can start engaging with 
one topical area and, almost without noticing, meander through numerous areas and sub-
fields of economics, as will be apparent below. On the other hand, there are numerous fea-
tures that indicate substantive differences. It is suggested that three core clusters (with some 
sub-clusters) can be distinguished in the unemployment debate:  
(1) a labour market cluster,  
(2) a poverty and development cluster, and  
(3) a macro/macro-sectoral cluster.    10
For each of these we identify seminal contributions and aspects of this discourse (including 
research method and techniques) in order to characterise the discourse and to determine its 
relation to adjacent or other clusters. 
 
3.  THE LABOUR MARKET DISCOURSE (CLUSTER 1)  
 
A first notable cluster of research can be seen as labour market analysis, but also involves a 
consideration of the informal sector. This cluster largely is anchored by a series of seminal 
papers by Kingdon and Knight. They were responding to a much earlier debate between 
Kantor (1980), Gerson (1981; 1982), Knight (1982), and Simkins (1978), in which the issues 
of voluntary as against involuntary unemployment, as well as structural unemployment, were 
debated (see also Bell 1982; Torr 1985; Fourie 1989). The style of these earlier contributions 
was theoretical and rhetorical, with empirical references limited to labour force numbers, 
participation rates and unemployment rates. 
 
3.1  Kingdon and Knight 
 
The Kingdon and Knight set of papers have been a dominant presence in the labour market 
discourse. They followed a 1996 ILO report on the South African labour market which, inter 
alia, questioned the use of the broad definition of unemployment and the inclusion of dis-
couraged workers, as well as the extent of voluntary unemployment (Standing et al 1996: 
104; 111). 
Based at the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) at Oxford University, 
Kingdon and Knight set out to settle some of these issues on the basis of econometric analy-
ses of the then just-released PSLSD 1993 household survey data as well as newer theories of 
segmented labour markets that involve rationing, i.e. demand-constrained equilibrium 
(Layard et al 1991:41-44; Kingdon and Knight 2004a:393-5; also see Cassim 1982; Hofmeyr 
2000). 
With extensive cross-sectional microeconometric analysis these papers also reflect a new 
technical standard in the field. Kingdon and Knight primarily used estimations of logit and   11
probit models and earnings functions across characteristics and conditions of the unem-
ployed and employed.  
Their conceptual context is, firstly, that of a segmented labour market as modelled by Layard 
et al (1991:41-44), but which comes from a longer tradition of dual markets or insider-
outsider models, dating back to Piore (1973). Kingdon and Knight adopt the Layard model 
and interpret the primary and secondary sectors in the South African context as being the 
formal and informal sectors. This means that the formal sector labour market is rationed 
(and thus non-clearing) due to efficiency wage setting or union-bargained wage setting, i.e. 
by actors with discretionary power.
4 Thus the presence of sticky, non-clearing wages also is 
characteristic of this approach.  
The informal sector is taken as competitive and market-clearing. Thus unemployed 
people are both involuntarily and voluntarily unemployed – they are willing to work in the 
rationed formal sector at the going wage there (but have not found work so far), but are not 
willing to work in the informal sector at the going wage.
5 Moreover, while such unwillingness 
to work is nominally voluntary, barriers to entry may mean “the available set of options is so 
limited as to render unemployment involuntary for the purpose of forming value judgements 
and making policies” (2004:394). 
Their main conclusions (besides calculating unemployment rates) can be summarized as 
follows, with reference to the distinctions in figure 1.
6 
 
(a)  On discouraged workers and the definition of unemployment  
Kingdon and Knight argue (2000; 2006a; 2006b) that the category of discouraged worker – 
non-searching unemployed – can and must be explicitly identified and recognised. They 
compare the non-searching and the searching unemployed and conclude that the non-
searchers are more deprived than the searchers (and thus face a greater incentive to secure 
employment), are not happier than the searching unemployed, and face greater discourage-
ment about the prospects of finding jobs and higher costs of job search (2000:6). Thus their 
                                                 
4 Kingdon and Knight (2008:307) report on earnings data and functions which suggest that “much of 
the formal sector pays well above the level of competitively determined market wages”.  
5 This is why Layard et al (1991:41) describe the voluntary-versus-involuntary contrapositioning and 
debate as “fruitless”. 
6 The category of subsistence activity, statistically classified by StatsSA as non-market production, is 
not shown. For developing countries this may be an important omission in analysis and in the statis-
tical status quo.   12
lack of job-search is not the outcome of preferences or ‘tastes’ but of constraints (2000:17). 
They are discouraged workers (and their unemployment decidedly involuntary). 
The main discouragement factors include a low likelihood of finding a job (high local 
unemployment, long duration of unemployment), poverty (access to water etc.), limited 
access to transport and facilities, high cost of searching, etc. (2000:4-5). 















Kingdon and Knight (2006a:310) also report regression results suggesting that the job 
search rate is decreased by higher rates of broad unemployment. Thus, high unemployment 
rates cause many of the unemployed to become discouraged workers. Kingdon and Knight 
conclude that under high-unemployment conditions such as those in South Africa discour-
aged workers cannot be excluded from the measure of unemployment. The non-searching 
unemployed effectively are an integral part of labour markets – their presence depress wages 
as set by employers. Therefore the broad definition of unemployment is appropriate (1999:8; 
2000:15-17; 2006b:485).
7 
                                                 
7 On the basis of an empirical investigation of the behaviour and characteristics of persons in various 
states of ‘labour force attachment’, Dinkelman and Perouz (2002:886) also reject the idea that non-
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Unionised    13
 
(b)  On voluntary vs. involuntary unemployment  
Kingdon and Knight (2004a) find that most unemployment is involuntary, not voluntary. 
Comparing the unemployed (both searching and non-searching) with those working in the 
informal sector, they conclude that the unemployed are substantially poorer and living in 
worse conditions, can gain substantially from informal (self- or wage) employment (given 
predicted earnings functions), and are less happy than (even) the informally employed or 
self-employed. Long periods of unemployment suggest it is not a ‘voluntarily chosen job 
search strategy’, that job search is inhibited by poverty, and that they face substantial barriers 
to enter the informal sector (2004a:395-403). Only 25% of the unemployed have quit vol-
untarily rather than due to sacking, retrenchment, illness, or having a temporary job 
(2004b:203). As Banerjee et al (2008:736) summarise the Kingdon and Knight findings: If 
unemployment were voluntary, we would expect the unemployed to be as happy as the em-
ployed, and discouraged workers to be as happy as the searching unemployed. 
 
(c)  On segmentation 
Kingdon and Knight find that the formal-informal earnings ratio is approximately 3.5:1. 
After controlling for different personal characteristics, the ratio still is approximately 1.75:1 
(2008:305). This indicates substantive segmentation between the formal and informal labour 
markets. 
 
(d)  Other notable findings  
The majority (62%) of the broadly unemployed have never held a job before. This is worse if 
a person is black, in a homeland, rural, female, young, and uneducated (Kingdon and Knight 
2004b:218). For 68% of the unemployed the duration has been more than 12 months 
(Kingdon and Knight 2004b:218).
8 
                                                 
8  The ILO report (Standing et al 1996:124-5), referring to similar 1994 OHS results, questions 
whether the available data in South Africa mean what they are interpreted to mean, i.e. is what dis-
couraged workers mean by a job the same as what the survey designers mean by it? The same applies 
to job seeking. Kingdon and Knight do not directly respond to this cautionary stance of the ILO re-
searchers. Nattrass (2000:79) argues that both the OHS and PSLSD questionnaires were geared to 
exclude any gainfully employed ‘unemployed’. Thus the high unemployment rates are not the result 
of a perception problem. Banerjee et al (2006: 17), using 2005 data, confirm these kinds of results 
(58.9% and 58.6% respectively). However, they do not discuss why 31.7% of those who have ‘never   14
  Rural unemployment rates are higher than urban rates (which is atypical among coun-
tries).
9 
  High-versus-low wage differentials in SA is not captured by the urban-rural division, but 
rather by non-homeland vs. homeland divisions (especially for broadly-measured unem-
ployment; 1999:10). 
  The informal sector absorbed 24% of the broad labour force in 2000, declining to 19% 
in 2002 (2004a:395). This is quite small and in international context an outlier (although 
their definition and measurement of the informal sector has been questioned).
10 
A noticeable aspect of the Kingdon and Knight analysis is that the Layard et al segmen-
tation model is interpreted in formal-informal sector terms without explanation (Layard et al 
merely distinguish a ‘primary’ and a ‘secondary’ sector). In this way their labour market 
analysis crosses over into an adjoining area, i.e. the informal sector. 
 
3.2  Other contributions 
 
(a)  On unionisation and segmentation 
Hofmeyr (2000) highlights the role of the growing influence of unions in wage setting (also 
see Moll 1993). After decades of legislated segmentation (job reservation, racial job markets 
and limitations on movement creating rural-urban and urban-urban segments), de facto liber-
alisation and union power may have resulted in a new form of segmentation in the labour 
                                                                                                                                                 
worked’ say their present unemployment spell has been less than one year. Also see Kingdon and 
Knight (2006:485). 
9 Later research of Klasen and Woolard (2008:2) confirms the continuation of this pattern, as does 
Banerjee et al (2006: 10-12). The latter also report a much higher rate of discouraged workers in the 
labour force in rural areas (40%) as against urban areas (below 10%). 
10 Since Kingdon and Knight (2004a) the appropriate definition and measurement of the informal 
sector also has become an area of contestation. The basic contrast is between an enterprise-based 
definition and one that also includes informal jobs in the formal sector. A more inclusive definition 
would increase the Kingdon and Knight number to approximately 31% for LFS 2003 data 
(2008:309), which still is relatively low. Other issues are whether domestic workers are to be included, 
and the treatment of persons in subsistence agriculture. See Heintz and Posel (2008:31, discussed 
below), Muller and Posel (2004), Muller (2003), Devey, Skinner and Valodia (2006), Valodia (2006; 
2007), Altman (2008b), Essop and Yu (2008) and, for a systematic comparison of the various meas-
ures proposed, Yu (2010a). Yu’s evidence suggest that the South African informal sector is in the 
mid-range of developing countries. Some scholars of South Africa, e.g. Fields (2011a; 2011b) argues 
that the concept of informality is too ambiguous and unspecific to be useful at all.   15
market, i.e. between unionised and non-unionised parts of the formal sector – in addition to 
that between the formal and informal sectors.
11  
Using worker characteristics in multivariate analysis, Hofmeyr estimates sectoral earnings 
functions to search for unexplained earnings differentials. On that basis he finds substantial 
segmentation between unionised and non-unionised workers in the formal sector and 
between the latter and informal sector workers. Thus, workers in these different segments 
cannot compete with each other even if they have the same skills and/or characteristics. 
 
(b)  On informal sector segmentation 
The work of Posel and some of her associates at the School of Development Studies (SDS) 
at UKZN constitutes a large amount of research, as technical and econometric as others, on 
labour markets and poverty. Notable is a pioneering focus on the position of women in the 
labour market (Casale and Posel 2002), but also labour migration (Posel and Casale 2003). 
Much of this have bearing on the unemployment issue. 
Heintz and Posel (2008) take the informal sector analysis further by considering labour 
market segmentation within the informal sector. They first raise the issue of the appropriate 
conceptualisation of the informal labour market, given the standard dualist approach of, for 
example, Kingdon and Knight. In contrast to Kingdon and Knight (2004a), they do not 
assume the informal sector to be unsegmented (and competitive), since that leaves the exis-
tence of high open unemployment and low informal sector employment unexplained. Their 
question is whether this puzzle is not explained by segmentation within the informal sector, 
and what the nature and extent of such segmentation might be.
12 Thus the informal sector is 
not conceptualised as a homogeneous category. This implies barriers to entry and barriers to 
mobility not only between formal an informal labour markets, but also into, and within, in-
formal activities themselves.  
Using more recent data they confirm the formal-informal segmentation found by 
Kingdon and Knight. Moreover, they find substantive earnings differentials between sub-
                                                 
11 His definition of segmented markets (2000:115) is as follows: where workers with identical skills 
earn different wages in different segments (or: where wage differences bear no relation to, or cannot 
be explained by, skill differences). Moll (1993) presents earlier findings on union-nonunion wage 
differentials amongst white workers. 
12 They define segmentation as “the existence of barriers to mobility within labour markets” (2008:26) 
which prevents individuals from switching to better remunerated types of employment.   16
sectors of the informal sector, after controlling for observable characteristics. This supports 
the hypothesis of entry and mobility barriers and the existence of subsectors within the in-
formal sector.
13 Informal employment thus is not a residual form of employment with 
negligible barriers to entry. The barriers may be important contributing factors explaining 
the high rates of open unemployment. 
They also argue for the adoption of an expanded definition of informal employment, 
rather than the traditional enterprise-based approach. This means also including formal sec-
tor employment in ‘unprotected jobs’ – workers without, for example, employment contracts 
or paid leave and pension contributions. This shows informal employment to have a much 
larger share of total employment (37%) than for the conventional definition (30%, for 2004), 
used by Kingdon and Knight (2004a).
14 
 
(c) On the impact of ‘too high’ reservation wages  
A standard market analysis of high informal sector unemployment would immediately con-
sider excessive reservation wages, below which unemployed individuals would choose not to 
work, a likely cause.  
There is no consistent evidence that unemployed people have unrealistic job and wage 
aspirations, i.e. excessive reservation wages (Kingdon and Knight 2001:93; 2004a:403).   
Nattrass and Walker (2005) report on a survey specifically designed to determine whether 
the unemployed are pricing themselves out of employment. For a metropolitan working 
class sample, the first determination is what respondents would regard as a minimum 
monthly wage below which they would not accept any job, even if unemployed. The second 
step is to compare that reservation wage (R1159 in 2000/1) with the predicted wages work-
ers realistically could expect to earn, given their characteristics. For the unemployed persons 
                                                 
13 The subsectors, as dictated by the available statistics, are: private, non-agricultural wage employ-
ment; non-agricultural self-employment (not own-account); non-agricultural self-employment (own-
account);  agricultural wage employment; agricultural self-employment; and public sector wage em-
ployment. Whether these distinctions make sense from a labour market and mobility barrier point of 
view is not discussed by the authors. For a distinction of segments of the informal sector that may 
reflect the reality of work in poor communities better, see Chen et al (2005), chapters 3 and 4. 
14 Kingdon and Knight (2004a) express the size of informal employment as a share of the labour 
force, not of total employment. The Heinz and Posel ‘expanded’ informal sector figure of 37% of 
total employment would translate to approximately 31% of the (broad) labour force – comparable to 
the 24% of Kingdon and Knight; the latter as a percentage of total employment would be approxi-
mately 30%. See footnote 9 above.   17
in the sample the reported reservation wage on average is only 85% of the predicted wage. A 
regression also reveals a significantly lower chance of being employed when the average 
wage exceeds the predicted wage. This supports a finding of no evidence that relatively high 
reservation wages are a cause of unemployment (in the area of Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain). 
According to Heintz and Posel (2008:29), national level data on reservation wages are 
not conclusive (at their time of writing), but the empirical evidence that does exist suggest it 
is unlikely that “unrealistic wage expectations” adequately account for the levels and persis-
tence of unemployment.
15 
Banerjee et al (2006:54; 2008:736) report pooled results, from several LFS waves in 2003-
05, on apparent reasons for not working. For unemployed persons aged 20 – 50, more than 
half reported being unable to find any work, irrespective of the wage/salary. The authors 
conclude that “reservation wages do not seem to be an important part of the story” (also see 
Klasen and Woolard 2008:39, discussed below). 
 
(d)  On constraints on labour force participation and search, especially in poor and rural areas 
Research by Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001), of DPRU and SALDRU respectively, also pro-
vide an econometric analysis of the labour market. They focus on black individuals and dis-
tinguish between males and females. Their rationale is that they want to focus on the most 
vulnerable (i.e. marginalised). In this sense this paper represents a shift of emphasis towards 
a poverty and development-oriented analysis of unemployment.   
They estimate employment probability and earnings functions, but provide a novel focus 
on the participation decision. Their parallel analysis of the probability of participation throws 
a different light on the question of voluntary/involuntary unemployment. By including both 
participation and employment equations, they are consciously “defining unemployment as a 
state that occurs despite a decision to participate in the labour market. It is therefore clearly 
involuntary” (2001:113).  
Specific factors hinder participation. Participation is lower in more rural provinces/areas, 
for females (and especially for those with a greater number of children and fewer adult 
women around), for those without secondary education, and if there are more male adults in 
                                                 
15 Nattrass and Walker (2005:504) as well as Klasen and Woolard (2008:37-9) provide econometric 
evidence of the determinants of reservation wages. The latter contribution (discussed in section 4.1 
below) find a non-significant impact for pension and remittance incomes and a positive impact for 
self-employment income and private income on reservation wages.    18
the household. They also find that a higher number of aged in the home (in all likelihood 
increasing pension income) may reduce male adult labour supply (2001:120). 
The participation equation shows that discouraged workers are those that are statistically 
closer (in terms of their characteristics) to the non-participants than to the narrowly un-
employed. This strongly suggests that those searching for employment are those that are (in 
their characteristics) more likely to get a job than those no longer searching; this therefore 
“hints at the importance of structural unemployment in understanding the participation de-
cision” of the discouraged worker (2001:127) – i.e. there is a mismatch of 
skills/characteristics and jobs. 
Unfortunately the limited OHS 1995 data set make a distinction between the formal and 
informal sectors impossible (2001:115), limiting their analysis with regard to segmentation. 
Nevertheless, Bhorat and Leibbrandt are able to estimate separate models for rural and 
urban areas, and find significant differences. One noteworthy result is an asymmetry on 
finding jobs: urban work-seekers could take rural jobs but, on average, rural work-seekers do 
not have the characteristics to compete in the urban job market (2001:127) – even if migra-
tion is possible and good labour market information is available. This suggests spatial rigidi-
ties and segmentation, implying barriers to entering urban labour markets. 
In a related paper, Leibbrandt, Bhorat and Woolard (2001:84) point to work by Witten-
berg (1999:42) that suggests that the rural unemployed do not face a level playing field with 
regard to efficient search strategies. The key transmitters of employment information are 
networks that stem from those in formal employment. In rural areas the number of un-
employed with no access to labour market or employed persons networks is far higher. The 
rural unemployment thus are disadvantaged in terms of access to labour market information. 
In addition, rural unemployed often join a household with welfare income, most likely old-
age pensioners in very remote areas. This increases the cost of search for these unemployed 
(also see Klasen and Woolard below). “Unfavourable labour market characteristics and lack 
of access to information about employment opportunities make it hard for the most needy 
rural unemployed to compete in the labour market” (2001:84). In this way poverty contributes to, 
or causes, unemployment. 
Dinkelman (2004) uses panel data from the KwaZulu-Natal KIDS survey to investigate 
household-related factors that may influence the success of job search of individuals in a 
five-year interval. Such factors appear to be quite important compared to demographic vari-  19
ables (Cichello et al 2005:147). The consistently significant factor in her regressions is the 
presence of pensioners in the household. Having a larger proportion of men and women of 
pensionable age in the household reduces the probability of search success for men – 
dramatically. This seems to confirm the non-panel findings of Bhorat and Leibbrandt above. 
Having old men in the household also reduces female search success – perhaps due to the 
need to care for these men. However, having an old woman in the household increases female 
search success hugely (2004:513). It appears to release working-age women from household 
duties.  
Regarding the net effect, Dinkelman concludes that, for individuals those without jobs, 
the household may function more as a safety net than as a source of finances for successful 
search activities (2004:517). In this respect having more pensioners (especially male) and 
working adults in a household may have important  negative labour supply effects.  
A novelty is her consideration of the household as a shaper of search culture and capac-
ity – as an institutional context within which particular views regarding work ethic, search 
ethic, know-how and motivation, but also literacy, language skills and access to transport can 
influence search effort and search success. However, these variables are unmeasurable and 
their effect on search success is assumed to be in the 20% unexplained residual attributable 
to unobservable household effects. 
Dinkelman and Perouz (2002), applying a conceptual framework of Wittenberg (2000, 
also in Wittenberg 2002:1167), investigate factors that determine the decisions of the jobless 
to adopt one of three ‘degrees of labour force attachment’: searching or non-searching un-
employed or out of the labour force (‘broadly’ defined). Using 1993 OHS data for logit re-
gressions, they find that unemployed men and women both are more likely to be searching 
when living in an urban area, and in an area with lower unemployment rates (2002:884). 
Being in rural areas and in areas with high unemployed contributes to a decision to be non-
searching (while having matric is a major positive factor inducing people to participate in the 
labour force). On the other hand, higher household income from work or other sources 
such as remittances reduces the incentive to become part of the labour force (either search-
ing or non-searching), as does the presence of migrant workers.    20
In general, they argue for a focus on different intensities of job search, rather than on 
binary searching/non-searching unemployed categories, in a search framework.
16 
 
(e) On the labour market effects of pensions and grants 
A secondary theme emerging from the contributions above is the labour market effects of 
old-age pensions (and other grants) due to pension sharing within the household. The key 
question is whether pension and grant receipts act as a disincentive to labour force participa-
tion and job search of other family members, or whether they capacitate and enable job search 
and employment. These effects appear to be complicated to unravel empirically, inter alia 
due to gender and age or generational dimensions which need to be differentiated.  
Bertrand et al (2003), using nationally-representative cross-sectional data, found that the 
pension dramatically reduces the labor supply of prime-age members of the household – but 
with a smaller reduction for prime-age women, and much more for the oldest prime-age 
male, often the oldest son. A female pensioner reduces the labour supply of family members 
twice as much than a male pensioner.  
In contrast, Posel et al (2006), using the same data but including labour migrants in the 
household, find no overall disincentive effect (2009:852). Moreover, a pension assists and 
encourages rural African women to become migrant workers (with female pension income 
as the main driver of this result).  
Ardington et al (2009), applying longitudinal analysis to KwaZulu-Natal ACDIS data, 
also highlight the importance of the impact on non-resident household members. They find 
that large cash transfers to the elderly lead to increased employment among prime-aged adults, 
primarily through labour migration. “The pension’s impact is attributable to the increase in 
household resources it represents, which can be used to stake migrants until they become 
self-sufficient, and to the presence of pensioners who can care for small children, which 
allows prime-aged adults to look for work elsewhere” (2009:22).  
                                                 
16 The use of ‘degrees of labour force attachment’ is an innovative way of looking at a spectrum of 
jobless and employment states rather than the conventional categories. It is part of a broader search 
approach to understanding unemployment. Also see Wittenberg (1999; 2000; 2002); the latter also 
shows a definite rural-urban dimension to labour market flows, in addition to racial and gender 
aspects.   21
Findings of Rancchod (2009) regarding ‘older adults’ are more consistent with Bertrand-
type results: he finds that the loss of a pension (due to death or out-migration) increases em-
ployment probabilities of resident middle-aged and older adults.  
Klasen and Woolard (2005, discussed in section 4.1 below) provide evidence on how 
old-age pensions cause the relocation of adult children to rural areas and away from job 
opportunities. However, Sienaert (2008:9; 40) finds no significant evidence in this regard.  
In a wide-ranging report engaging with most earlier research, Sienaert (2008), using 2002-
2004 LFS-based cross-section and constructed panel data, distinguishes results for participa-
tion and employment. He finds that the old-age pension “is associated with statistically sig-
nificant declines in labour force participation and employment probabilities, amongst prime-
age individuals in pension-receiving households. These effects are much larger and more 
robust for employment than broadly-defined participation, and occur mainly when pension 




(f) On transitions between employment states and between informal and formal sectors 
Banerjee et al (2006, published as 2008) is a component of the ‘Harvard panel’ work that was 
commissioned for the South African government’s ASGISA initiative. They provide novel 
insight into job search and constraints faced by the unemployed by quantitatively analysing 
transitions from unemployment to employment states (and vice versa) as well as transitions 
between the informal and formal sectors (also see Cichello et al 2005 for similar work on 
regional data from the 1990s). 
The analysis is based on panel data comprising matched LFS waves between September 
2001 and March 2004.
18 The resulting transition matrices (2006:36) show that, amidst a rela-
tively stable overall unemployment rate, significant flows of workers across employment 
states occur – there is a lot of ‘churning’. But entry into employment is not easy. For exam-
ple, for adults 16–64: 
                                                 
17 All these research findings relate to the old-age pension and not the recently expanded system of 
child support grants, which brought the total number of individuals receiving social grants to more 
than 15 million in the 2011/12 financial year. The value of the child grant is about a quarter of the 
old-age pension. Bengtsson (2010) indicates a negative impact on adult labour supply, while Eyal and 
Woolard (2011) report an opposite effect for a group of black mothers. 
18 Ranchod and Dinkelman (2008) provide more detail on the methods used in matching and analys-
ing the data, and possible pitfalls.   22
  Of the combined unemployed (either searching or discouraged), only 17% find employ-
ment (in either the formal or informal sectors) within six months.
19 
  Of the searching unemployed, 50% still are searching after six months, 19% have 
become employed, 16% have stopped searching, and 14% have become not economi-
cally active. 
  Of the non-searching unemployed (discouraged workers), 36% still are in that state after 
six months, 29% have started actively searching for work, 14% got a job, and 19% have 
left the labour force. 
  Among the not economically active, about 21% changed their status to unemployed, 
wanting work (both searching and non-searching), but only about 8% have become 
employed after six months. 
In general, urban residents, Africans and younger workers are less likely to make the transi-
tion from unemployment to employment (2006:45). Another salient point is the importance 
of that first job. Individuals who have never before held a job are 35 percentage points more 
likely to be unemployed than workers that have worked before (2006:33; 39). 
The general picture is one where job search and job finding is quite difficult and appar-
ently subject to many constraints, e.g. long distances from labour markets, high physical 
costs of job search, possible racial prejudice against Africans, etc.  
The authors also provide interesting results regarding the link between the informal and 
formal sectors (2006:36): 
  Only 12% of those who are initially working in the informal sector make a transition to 
the formal sector within six months, 52% remain in informal employment, 21% become 
unemployed and 12% drop out of the labour force. Thus the informal sector is not a 
strong springboard into the formal sector (2006:5; 42) – as indicated by earlier findings 
of segmentation (Kingdon and Knight etc.). 
  However, it is easier to enter the formal sector from the informal sector (12% of infor-
mal sector employees make the transition) than from searching (9.5%) and non-search-
ing (4.2%) unemployed states. 
                                                 
19 Dinkelman (2004), working with gendered KIDS data from KwaZulu-Natal, produces evidence of 
higher transition-to-employment rates if the time period is significantly longer: 44% of African men 
and 49% of African women transition from being ‘searching unemployed’ in 1993 to being employed 
five years later. For the non-searching unemployed the corresponding values are 39% and 31%.   23
  Discouraged workers are twice as likely to find work in the informal sector than in the 
formal sector. (For the searching unemployed the likelihood of formal sector employ-
ment is the same as for the informal sector.) 
Thus the informal sector serves as a step towards formal sector employment, but its enabling 
impact is very limited. The overwhelming majority do not succeed to make the transition.  
This conclusion complements earlier work by Cichello et al (2005) using the KIDS data 
from KwaZulu-Natal. They provide similar transition matrices but cover a five-year interval 
(1993-1995) rather than the six months of Banerjee et al. In the longer time period a higher 
percentage (17% as against 12% above) make the transition from informal to formal, fewer 
(42% against 52%) remain in informal employment, but a higher percentage of informal 
sector workers end up being non-employed (41% against 33%) (2005:169). Over a longer 
period the informal sector is a less stable work environment. But the formal sector is not 
much better: 24% of formal sector workers in 1993 also ended up as non-employed five 
years later.
20 
Similarly, Altman (2008b:35), using unpublished 2008 results by Valodia, reports an aver-
age sustained informal-to-formal transition for 18.3% individuals (for several 6-month 
periods), and only 7% to remain in informal unemployment for five 6-month periods. This 
results, for country-wide data, confirms that informality is an unstable employment state 
over time for most individuals. However, 54% of all workers experienced a work status 
change in a two-year period from February 2002 to March 2004. 
 
(g) On the impact of education on unemployment 
Given the apartheid legacy of an inferior education system for black children, the impact of 
low levels of education and resultant skills gaps on earnings differentials and employment is 
a recurrent theme, also in the public debate (cf Van den Berg and Burger 2003:498). In many 
research contributions analysed in this project the education level of individuals is used as an 
explanatory variable in explaining (un)employment probabilities labour market dimensions. 
However, few contributions focus directly on education and unemployment, with Kingdon 
                                                 
20 Also interesting is that those who remained in informal employment experienced must larger in-
creases in earnings than those who stayed in formal employment, albeit from a much lower base. 
There was considerable upward mobility with the informal sector, and a significant narrowing of the 
formal-informal earnings differential occurred (Cichello et al 2005:173).    24
and Knight (2005) and especially Dias and Posel (2007) welcome exceptions. Nevertheless, 
several aspects of labour demand and supply receive attention elsewhere. 
On the labour demand side, Bhorat and Hodge (1999) show how changes in production 
methods have led to positive demand effects for skilled workers and negative effects for un-
skilled workers over a long period, i.e. 1970–1995. Recent research suggests that the shift 
towards demand for more skilled labour has continued (Dias and Posel 2007:3; 19). In 
macro-sectoral analyses (see section 7), Banerjee et al (2008) and Rodrik (2006) note that in 
South Africa agriculture, mining and manufacturing have been the activities most intensive 
in unskilled labor. But they also have been the sectors in relative decline. This structural 
change away from the most low-skills intensive parts – and resultant skills supply-and-
demand mismatches – is key to understanding the concentration of unemployment among 
the young, unskilled and black population (Rodrik 2006:2).  
On the labour supply side, Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001:113) show that labour market 
participation is lower for those without secondary education. Kingdon and Knight (2005:5) 
also show that participation levels typically increase with education level, particularly for 
women. Klasen and Woolard (2005, discussed below) identify poor initial education as a 
factor that impedes labour market access. 
Dias and Posel (2007:2) demonstrate that unemployment rates in the South African 
labour market decrease with educational attainment: “education protects against unemploy-
ment” (2007:9). Analysing 1995 OHS and 2003 LFS data they find that, overall, the un-
employed had lower levels of education than the employed. Their probit regressions show 
that “individuals with higher education had a significantly lower probability of being un-
employed. For example, in 1995, labour force participants with tertiary education on average 
were twenty per cent less likely than otherwise identical individuals but with only primary 
education, to be unemployed” (2007:9). 
However, the pattern found by Dias and Posel is not constant (nor always intuitive).
21 
For example, after 1995 (up to 2003) the unemployed group shows increasing proportions of 
persons with tertiary, matric and incomplete secondary education. In fact, in this interval un-
                                                 
21 Kingdon and Knight (2005) – who used the same data but somewhat coarser education level 
distinctions – also highlight the conflicting outcomes for 1995 and 2003: “While secondary and 
higher education reduced the chances of long-duration unemployment (my italics) by about 5 to 6 per-
centage points in 1995, by the year 2003, possession of these levels of education did not reduce the 
chances of long-duration unemployment at all” (2005:18).   25
employment increased most amongst both those with some secondary education and those 
with matric (perhaps due to labour force effects?).
22 On the other hand, the relative benefits 
of tertiary education in protecting against unemployment grew by almost five percentage 
points in this period.
23  
It appears that the link between education and unemployment is not stable. The effect of 
education on unemployment probability also is not linear, i.e. it is not monotonically in-
creasing in education levels: “… the benefits of higher education in securing employment 
only ‘kick in’ when labour force participants have at least matric education” (Dias and Posel 
2007:11).  
This confirms the first known identification of this pattern by Wittenberg (1999; 
2002:1191; also see Dinkelman and Perouz 2002). Using non-parametric and careful 
graphical analysis – showing the benefits of ‘staring at the data’ – he shows that the inverse 
relationship between education and the probability of being unemployed really starts once 
working-age persons have a matric qualification or more, after little effect of years of 
schooling below that level  (2002:1165; 1191; also Ardington et al 2009: 28-9). He attributes 
this to the lack of other signalling factors available to employers in sorting job applicants. 
While education at lower levels may in many ways be important in breaking the cycle of 
poverty and inequality,
24 as far as unemployment as such is concerned, only higher levels 
appear really to make a significant difference. 
The value of matric co-exists with high and increasing youth unemployment. Lam et al 
(2008) record panel data results that confirm that “in contrast to the view sometimes ex-
pressed in South Africa, completing secondary school does appear to have a substantial ef-
fect on successfully finding a job after leaving school” – and soon, in the first four years 
(2008:16-18). The puzzle is why more youth do not complete matric to increase the prob-
ability of a transition into employment, and rather choose to leave school early to join the 
                                                 
22 Dias and Posel (2007:5; 15) also highlight the complex impact of race and gender on the relation-
ship between education and unemployment. 
23 Although employment rates rose among those with tertiary education, these labour force partici-
pants became even less likely than those with only primary education to be unemployed (Dias and 
Posel 2007:11). This throws some light on the puzzle of rising unemployment rates amongst gradu-
ates (Moleke 2005; Pauw et al 2008). 
24 For discussions of the impact of education on, for example, earnings inequality and intergenera-
tional mobility, see Van der Berg and Burger (2003) and Louw et al (2007).   26
ranks of the unemployed, often for long periods. Racial differences related to a longer-run 
legacy of disadvantaged schooling and school quality is one potential explanation (2008:19). 
Amongst those with more education there also is in increase in rates of job search (Dias 
and Posel 2007:9). This reinforces the view of Wittenberg (1999:31) that better educated 
individuals have a higher propensity to search. Likewise, Dinkelman and Perouz (2002:884) 
find that the matric certificate has the single largest positive effect on inducing people to 
participate in the labour force and tertiary education is most likely to drive men and women 
into search, if they do not already have jobs.  
A related issue is that of migrants. Posel et al (2006:844) find that labour migrants tend 
to be significantly more educated on average than non-migrant adults in a rural sample.  
Lastly, Dias and Posel (2007: 21-23) find little evidence that skills shortages are a major 
factor in constraining employment expansion by firms. There appears to be no general 
excess demand for labour due to a skills constraint on labour supply. Less than 10% of all 
the unemployed in the 2003 LFS attribute their joblessness to a lack of skills or qualifications 
for jobs that were available. In two firm surveys quoted, firms noted skills shortages as a 
constraint, but put it only 5
th or 6
th on the list; “there is little evidence of extensive shortages 
of skills leading to sustained vacancies in firms” (2007:23; see Devey et al 2005:55; 70). Lack 
of work experience apparently is a much more important factor – but such skills cannot be 
acquired through formal education. For Dias and Posel (2007:27) this underscores the 
importance of focusing on factors, in addition to the quality of labour supplied and other 
aspects of labour supply, that inhibit an increase in the demand for labour.
25  
 
3.3  The first discourse diagram 
 
These contributions suffice to define, capture and characterise the labour market discourse 
about unemployment in South Africa. Diagrammatically cluster 1, the labour market dis-
course cluster, as discussed above, can be depicted as in figure 2. It shows a set of themes 
                                                 
25 Amsden (2010:64; 57), commenting on grass-roots efforts to solve poverty through better educa-
tion, health and living conditions, argues that these do not go far enough “because it aims only at 
improving the supply side of the labor market, making job-seekers more capable, and not the 
demand side, making new jobs available for them. It acts as though new ways of earning a living 
emerge (at a positive wage) simply because the supply of job-seekers is better clothed, housed, and 
fed”.   27
and approaches clustered around the micro-economic labour-market analysis of unemploy-
ment. Bold text indicate the core areas. The dotted-line text box shows an area that concep-
tually belong in this cluster, but does not feature in the published labour market research on 
unemployment in South Africa. Its relevance will be seen as the discourse diagram is 





















The contributions in this cluster share a typical labour market style of analysis, with only 
limited recognition of issues such as poverty and inequality. However, the approach of 
Bhorat and Leibbrandt (2001) relates this labour market discourse to an unemployment dis-
course that involves poverty – which takes us to the next section. 
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4.  THE POVERTY AND DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE (CLUSTER 2) 
 
We have reached an identifiably new cluster, where the study of the labour market is embed-
ded in an analysis of poverty and income inequality amongst households: we move from un-
employment to poverty and inequality. It is useful to distinguish two sub-discourses. 
 
4.1  Sub-discourse 2A:  From unemployment to poverty and inequality dynamics 
 
The 2001 paper, quoted above, by Bhorat (from DPRU) and Leibbrandt (from SALDRU) is 
part of a larger study of labour markets and inequality/poverty in South Africa (see Bhorat et 
al 2001). It represents a core focus of the SALDRU research effort, i.e. measuring, under-
standing, explaining and addressing inequality and poverty. The DPRU has a similar focus, 
with perhaps a stronger policy consultancy perspective.
26 Whilst the focus is on inequality 
and poverty, this work contains some important insights for any study of unemployment. 
 
(a) On the importance of labour market income in inequality 
In Leibbrandt, Woolard and Bhorat (2001) the question is how the functioning of the labour 
market – and thus unemployment – relates to, or explains, household incomes inequality and 
poverty. The main technique is the decomposition of inequality, i.e. the Gini coefficient, by 
income sources (wage income, self-employment, capital income, state transfers and remit-
tances). 
Their inequality decomposition for 1995 Income Expenditure Survey data reveals that 
household wage income is a dominant factor determining the poverty status of the house-
hold and the position of the household in the distribution of total income (2001:30-1):  
  84% of income comes from wage income, remittances and self-employment income (= 
total labour-market derived income). 
  Wage inequality makes a 67% contribution to the overall Gini coefficient of 0.59 in 
1995. (For blacks this figure may be as high as 80%.) 
                                                 
26 The establishment of both SALDRU and DPRU at the same university, ending up in one depart-
ment, is an illustration of the potential role of institutional history (relating to personalities, ideology, 
funding and institutional politics) in shaping an academic discourse landscape.   29
  There are immense income gaps between high- and low-wage earners, and between the 
formal and the informal self-employed. 
This means that wage income is driving household inequality, and that “access to wage in-
come is central to determining which households are able to avoid poverty and even the 
depth to which poor households sink below the poverty line” (2001:34). Households with 
unemployed members tend to be crowded below the poverty line at the lower end of the 
household income distribution (2001:39).  
Similarly Leibbrandt, Bhorat and Woolard (2001) report that the unemployed predomi-
nantly are found in households with no access to wage income. In 1993, 53% of the un-
employed lived in a household with no wage earner – a majority of the unemployed indi-
viduals live in completely unemployed households – and three-quarters of these were in 
poverty. Having at least one member of the household in wage employment almost halved 
the probability of that household being in deep poverty (2001:80).  
Thus unemployment is a major cause of poverty – suggesting bi-directional causality between 
unemployment and poverty (see 3.2(d) above). It will be discussed in section 6. 
 
(b)  On poverty traps and unemployment 
Klasen and Woolard (2005) study the determinants of income mobility, i.e. which factors 
cause households to get out of, or into, poverty. On the basis of cross-section econometric 
analysis of a constructed panel of household data they identify factors that explain income 
changes in a five-year period.   
First, a family member getting (or losing) a job is the main event causing a move out of 
(or into) poverty. An additional dependent family member is the second most important, 
with changes in remittances in third place. Changes in earnings/wages are much less impor-
tant.  
Secondly, four types of poverty traps are found, i.e. initial conditions that impede efforts 
of households to improve their incomes. These are: large initial household size, poor initial 
education, poor initial asset endowment and poor initial employment access (i.e. links to the 
labour market). Thus “households with few initially employed members and large numbers 
of unemployed are finding it more difficult to improve their incomes subsequently” 
(2005:884). This poverty trap, associated with the labour market, suggests “significant seg-  30
mentation and disadvantages for those from households with little labour market experi-
ence” (2005:884). 
 
(c)  On survival strategies, regional immobility and location rigidities in labour markets 
Klasen and Woolard (2008) ask two main questions: First, how do the unemployed survive? 
Secondly, “how can it be that unemployment is so high in rural areas where there exists 
almost no enforced labour regulations … and where wages could (presumably) freely adjust 
to equilibrate labour demand and supply?” (2008:4). 
Using multinomial logit analysis of various household surveys from 1993 to 2006, they 
find that many of the unemployed attempt to survive by attaching themselves to a household 
where there is some form of income, mostly old-age pensions and other social grants.
27 This 
pertains, in particular, to unemployed adult children who either stay with their parents (even 
beyond the age of 25) or move to stay with other family (2008:25-27). Frequently this also 
applies to those who become unemployed. This often keeps them in, or takes them into, more 
remote rural areas.   
Moreover, it takes them further away from areas with employment opportunities and 
may thus discourage job search from there (2008:31). Estimates of participation and search-
ing equations show that it also reduces their employment prospects and thus search enthusi-
asm (2008:35). Furthermore, they find little evidence that access to pension and remittance 
income discourage search via higher reservation wages (2008:39). The location decision of 
the unemployed – which gives primacy to economic support/survival rather than employ-
ment or search opportunities – is the main causal factor (2008:40). Its net effect is the creation 
of regional immobility and locational rigidities in the labour market (2005:4; 28). It also helps to 
explain the persistence of high (involuntary) rural unemployment, despite no apparent re-
striction on labour market and wage flexibility in those areas.
28 It also reinforces findings 
                                                 
27 This research was under undertaken before the significant expansion of the system of child grants, 
which potentially could have a significant impact on individual and household behaviour. 
28 Dinkelman (2004) uses panel data from the KwaZulu-Natal KIDS survey to investigate house-
hold-related factors that may influence the success of job search over a five-year interval. As for 
locational (rural-versus-urban) differences, she finds no statistically significant effect. (The un-
expected indication is that initially being in urban areas in KwaZulu-Natal may have reduced the 
probability of finding a job compared to being in rural areas initially. She attributes this to peculiari-
ties of the particular geographic region of the sample.)   31
(reported above) that the survivalist behaviour of those in poverty contributes to, or causes, 
unemployment. 
 
4.2  Sub-discourse 2B:  From poverty to sustainable livelihoods and marginalisation 
 
A next resting place in the meander is the adjacent study of poverty and sustainable liveli-
hoods, often also in the context of dualism – either between the formal and informal sectors, 
urban and rural areas, or the first and second economies – or simply in the phenomenon of 
economic marginalisation. The place of unemployment in this discourse is different from 
those encountered thus far. 
Work done at PLAAS, the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies at the University 
of the Western Cape, is representative of this approach.
29 Du Toit (2005) presents a survey 
of much of the programme’s research. The focus is on the structural dimensions of poverty, 
and specifically chronic poverty, and the livelihood strategies of the poor. 
 
(a)  On deprivation, social dynamics and labour market marginalisation 
Noting that much less progress has been made with poverty reduction since the 1990s than 
was initially hoped, Du Toit draws attention to a different aspect of poverty (and, by impli-
cation, employment and unemployment), i.e. “the complexity and diversity of the social 
dynamics and power relations that underpin it” (2005:1). He criticises analytical traditions 
that “tend to depoliticise the study of poverty”, often through econometric equations. 
The PLAAS research method is focused on bringing together both quantitative and 
qualitative research. The work covers poverty in three types of areas: rural homeland, platte-
land town and city township. It is based on a broad concept of ‘multidimensional depriva-
tion’ in which monetary deficiency is only one of  a set of vulnerabilities – rather than 
monetary poverty (low income) alone.  
Thus their surveys explore a range of livelihood components and indicators of depriva-
tion – e.g. human capital, household assets, access to services, debts vulnerability, geo-social 
integration, informal and formal networks, health issues, day-to-day household reserves, and 
                                                 
29 Another group of researchers are based at the School of Development Studies at the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal, and some in various departments (other than economics) at the University of Cape 
Town.   32
so forth The survey questions seem to have a different tone compared to other household 
surveys.  
They also complement the surveys with in-depth interviews with household heads and 
primary caregivers. At selected households they record household member life histories, also 
mapping broader social networks and local political economic dynamics and forces. 
This broader method reflects in their data and results. Amongst the key indicators of 
deprivation they find, for example, that 70-83% of households report going hungry in the 
previous year. In addition, in some sites up to 64% of households “often went without suffi-
cient food”; or up to 45% of households “often went without sufficient fuel”; and up to 
55% of households often went without sufficient shelter” (2005:6-8).  
Other research report significant asset poverty and low rates of access to productive 
resources, even resources for effective household-level food production. A high degree of 
cash dependency is prevalent, as is poorly paid and insecure employment, once gained (2005: 
7-8). 
The qualitative data reveal that poor people frequently are vulnerable to exploitation and 
manipulation by those who are more powerful – the ‘political economy of poverty and live-
lihoods’. It comprises the way they are positioned in the local configuration of aspects such 
as asset distribution, levels of education, access to resources, labour market marginality (em-
ployment insecurity and unemployment), and notably social networks and social power rela-
tions in their communities – for example relative to the rural elite, public officials and other 
influential resource and employment-opportunity gatekeepers (2005:4; 7-11).  
Thus the indicators of deprivation reflect factors, including power relations, that under-
mine livelihood and survival strategies – including access to labour markets. Moreover, the 
interaction of these factors can make a successful and sustainable escape from poverty, e.g. 
through employment, very difficult. This also applies to successful self-employment (Du 
Toit and Neves 2007:46). This highlights the strategies by which poor people or their chil-
dren try to escape, including employment search – and the reasons why such attempts may 
fail or be successful (2005:3; also see Klasen and Woolard 2008). 
Whereas the SALDRU-DPRU research in cluster 2A embed unemployment in an 
inequality-poverty nexus, here the entire unemployment-inequality-poverty nexus is embed-
ded even deeper in a rich context of social networks, social relationships, power relationships 
and systemic historical and political-economic forces.    33
The explanation of unemployment-inequality-poverty becomes much more complex 
than labour market inflexibility, distortions or inefficiencies (or similar factors typically cap-
tured in standard research). Referring to typical labour market analyses as ‘decontextualised’, 
Du Toit notes that the unemployed, the marginal workers, employees and employers do not 
encounter each other in a labour market on equal footing as abstract homo economicus, but as 
individuals and groups shaped and situated in society by (in my words) a history of complex 
interaction and symbiosis between colonialism, capitalism, racism, sexism and apartheid (see 
Du Toit 2005: 14, also 19-20).
30 
Therefore, in understanding and addressing poverty, inequality and unemployment, a 
broader social, sociological and political reality has to be engaged with than ‘malfunctioning 
labour markets’. This may require a greater diversity of research methodologies, including 
field work and case studies (as is often done by PLAAS researchers). Econometric investiga-
tions of the duration of income poverty (including unemployment) need to be comple-
mented by information on the underlying structural dimensions that render people vulner-
able to being poor for long periods of time (2005:4).  
The problem, says Du Toit (referring to Bhorat et al 2001), is not that the poor are ex-
cluded from participating in the economy on grounds such as race, gender, education and 
location. They are participating in the economy. But the way they are enabled/allowed to 
participate and the way labour markets function can worsen their poverty, and the normal 
functioning of the economy can perpetuate the inequalities that one observes (2005:20). 
 
(b)  On segmentation, dualism and the ‘second economy’ 
Du Toit and Neves (2007) make a related point on segmentation and dualism, in particular 
the ‘second economy’ metaphor, introduced in the Mbeki-era.
31 This was a recognition that 
                                                 
30 “…the argument about rigidity and inefficiency seems rather decontextualised in light of the deeply 
racialised and authoritarian history of South African capitalism, state formation and modernisation. 
The landless unemployed, the marginal working class, workers and employers do not encounter each 
other as abstract homo economicus but as individuals and groups drawing in all their decision-making on 
cultural repertoires, political and ideological resources, frameworks of identity and assumptions thor-
oughly structured by more than 300 years of violent, racist, exploitative and brutalising history” (Du 
Toit 2005: 14, also 19-20). 
31 The concept but not the term was introduced by President Thabo Mbeki. He spoke of ‘two 
nations’, and separate First World and Third World economies. Also, the term second economy was 
not intended to be equivalent to the informal sector, but was quickly christened so by the business   34
trickle-down effects don’t work well for those at the margin, requiring different interven-
tions. But the concept was open to misinterpretation. Whereas many see the second econ-
omy as being structurally disconnected from the first economy, in reality formal and infor-
mal, mainstream and marginal activities often are thoroughly interdependent (2007:iv; also 
Devey et al 2008:114; Devey and Valodia 2009). The problem of poverty and unemployment 
is not that many people are excluded from or unintegrated with the economy. But the way 
they are integrated causes them to be marginalised and powerless to change their position 
vis-à-vis the ‘centre’ and to assert themselves as empowered economic actors (2007:36). This 
applies to both rural and urban situations. 
The challenge is not to eliminate the ‘laggard’ informal or second economy or integrate it 
into the first economy, but to adapt the way the (single, but internally differentiated) econ-
omy functions so that the marginalised individuals and informal (or survivalist) businesses 
are empowered and their livelihood and employment strategies supported (also see May and 
Meth 2007; Von Broembsen 2008).
32 
 
(c) On the chronic unemployed as an underclass excluded from employment opportunities 
Seekings (2003; also Seekings and Nattrass 2005: chapter 8) asks whether the unemployed 
constitute an ‘underclass’. What he refers to here, is the 69% of the unemployed who have 
never worked before, or the two-thirds of the unemployed with incomes below the poverty 
line (2003:20) – and the 68% of the unemployed have been unemployed for more than 12 
months (2003:10). 
Analysing the 1993 PSLSD and 1995 OHS data, he finds that there is evidence that a 
significant portion of the unemployed and their dependents are in an underclass defined in 
terms of acute disadvantage. Factors underpinning such special disadvantage in the labour 
market are: 
  Long duration of unemployment – many are long-term unemployed, and have lost the 
capacity to seek or secure employment. 
                                                                                                                                                 
community (Du Toit and Neves 2007:6). Actually the second economy is broader and includes the 
involuntary unemployed and some of the economically inactive. 
32 Altman (2008b:9) notes the distinction between the dualist and structuralist approaches to the in-
formal or second economy (and also a ‘legalist’ approach). Du Toit and Neves would be closer to the 
structuralist approach (the second economy as an integral feature of capitalist development), and the 
Mbeki-approach more dualist (i.e. the second economy as a by-product of underdevelopment).   35
  Low human capital – they are or have become unemployable, lacking the minimum skills 
required in the labour market. 
  Lack of social capital – they have lost or limited contact to social networks or connec-
tions to employment opportunities via other working family members or working friends 
(e.g. migrant workers). This is a particularly important factor, given the way job search 
(by the unemployed) and recruitment processes (by employers) work in South African 
labour markets (2003: 13-18). 
  Location – they are located a significant distance from areas with employment 
opportunities, and/or face bad roads to markets etc., often having attached themselves 
to families in remote areas that receive social pensions (cf Klasen and Woolard 2008 
above).  
  Lack of financial capital for possible self-employment (2003:19). 
More than 80% of the potential underclass are in the bottom four deciles of the income dis-
tribution, and more than 50% in the bottom two deciles (2003:21). For this underclass, more 
than 80% of their income comes from pensions and remittances (2003:24; 1993 data).  
Such underclass households are less likely to be living in a house, less likely to have piped 
water or a toilet inside the dwelling, and less likely to be satisfied with life. They are suscepti-
ble to a range of psychological, social and motivational problems: anxiety, fear, depression, 
feeling useless and without energy; suffering from boredom, having low self-esteem, being 
lonely, without friends or love partners (2003:34). 
Because of all these factors, and in particular the lack of social capital and networks, these 
individuals and households are characterised by exclusion from access to employment opportunities, or at 
least are very disadvantaged in terms of such access (2003: 4).  
There also is the possibility – not yet researched, given data limitations – that the under-
class actually reproduces itself over generations, with the children that are born into under-
class households today destined (i.e. with a high probability) to long periods of unemploy-
ment in ten or twenty years time (2003: 41). This would impart an ingrained, long-term char-
acter to unemployment in South Africa. 
   36
4.3  The second discourse diagram 
 
These contributions define, capture and characterise a poverty and development discourse – 
with two sub-discourses – about unemployment in South Africa. Diagrammatically cluster 2 
can be depicted as in figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 
















Note that some of the theme boxes also appear in figure 2, the labour market discourse 
cluster. This is important because it shows that, amidst clustering, the various themes and 
contributions do connect and even overlap. Nevertheless, how they relate to each other is 
important, as will become clearer when all the clusters are combined in one diagram (see 
below and in follow-up article).  
 
Although a third discourse is to be discussed shortly, it is useful to take stock at this stage. 
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5.   THE FIRST TWO DISCOURSES: AN OVERVIEW 
 
5.1  Meander overview 
 
The trip has taken us a long way, from Kingdon and Knight’s labour market analysis to 
inequality, poverty, livelihood and underclass analysis, through different foci, data, theoreti-
cal frameworks, ideological paradigms, analytical and research techniques, and institutional 
centres. While they may be asking different questions, all in some way related to unemploy-
ment and provide valuable insights. 
The identified discourses are not narrow in themselves. In delineating and outlining the 
labour-market discourse (cluster 1) we have travelled across the discourse landscape from a 
labour-market analysis of unemployment – finding that most unemployment is involuntary 
and that discouraged workers are an integral part of labour markets – to segmentation 
between the informal sector and the formal sector (with sticky, non-market-clearing wages), 
segmentation caused by unionization, segmentation and mobility barriers within the informal 
sector, rural-urban segmentation, barriers that face the (rural) poor wishing to enter labour 
markets – and finally a quantitative picture of how these factors are reflected in difficult 
transitions from either unemployment to employment or the informal to the formal sectors. 
The second discourse – cluster 2 on poverty and development – is somewhat different. 
Whilst remaining broadly aligned with the basic paradigm of the labour market discourse, the 
frame of reference has broadened significantly (and encompasses two sub-discourses). Thus, 
in moving further across the discourse landscape we found, first, an analysis of labour 
markets and household inequality and how poverty traps, survival strategies and spatial im-
mobility in poor, rural areas inhibit labour market access (cluster 2A).  
Secondly, in cluster 2B we encountered themes such as: the impact of chronic poverty 
conditions on employment and unemployment, the chronic marginalisation and powerless-
ness of the poor unemployed and poor workers which severely inhibit their access to em-
ployment/labour markets, unfavourable positioning in social networks and social power 
relations, the debilitating impact of poverty-related psychological, social and motivational 
problems on job search, etc. This analysis also produces a different way of understanding 
dualism, specifically the asymmetric way in which the poor are integrated into the ‘first’ 
economy.   38
 
5.2   The discourse landscape diagram: finding one’s way in the debate 
 
Diagrammatically the two main discourse clusters identified thus far can be depicted as in 
figure 4. It provides a visual-spatial mapping of a large part of the unemployment debate in 
South Africa, situating the main contributions in clusters and relative to each other. Future 
research contributions can be situated within this diagram, or be used to refine the diagram. 
 
Figure 4  
Two complete discourses: The labour market and poverty & development clusters  
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6.   PROVISIONAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
 
Although the analysis of all the discourses and clusters relating to unemployment in South 
Africa has not been completed, some provisional comments are in order. 
Our main questions are: Do the contributions in the two discourses generate a coherent 
picture of the unemployment issue? Are there integrated, cross-informed debates – or differ-
ent worlds? 
This survey and meta-analysis has been dominated by a few themes: unemployment, 
inequality, poverty. But these are treated differently in the different discourses. A compari-
son reveals the following tendencies. 
 
6.1 Emerging differences 
 
There are definite differences between the first two discourses and within the second, with its 
two sub-discourses.  
A first issue is the relationship between unemployment, poverty and inequality, given the 
developing country context. The labour market analysis of unemployment in cluster 1 uses 
measures of poverty in its analysis and equations, but poverty and inequality are not the real 
concern. In contrast, cluster 2A focuses on explaining inequality and aspects of poverty 
rather than unemployment. Nevertheless, it highlights how the condition of structural 
poverty inhibits information on employment opportunities as well as access to labour 
markets – and thus the functioning of labour markets (whether informal or formal). Cluster 
2A also provides valuable insights on unemployment as a major contributor to poverty and 
human suffering.  
In this way the unemployment-related work in cluster 2A shows more sensitivity to 
underdevelopment and vulnerability than ‘purer’ labour market analyses such as those in 
cluster 1. However, whilst displaying a solid mix of development economics and labour eco-
nomics, the broader human development angle is not very prominent. The focus is on pov-
erty as low household income. When aspects of education and health feature, they do so 
primarily as ‘worker characteristics’ used in explaining inequality, poverty, employment or 
unemployment. Aspects of human development such as capabilities (Sen 1992) appear to be at   40
the margins of analysis. This is the source of one of the criticisms of cluster 2A emanating 
from cluster 2B (Du Toit/PLAAS), which suggests and uses a richer understanding of 
‘multidimensional deprivation’ – although the marginalisation/livelihood cluster itself 
focuses on poverty relief and reduction rather than human development in the broader sense 
indicated above.  
Also, the poverty and inequality analysis in cluster 2A largely leaves the qualitative 
dimensions of poverty, and notably social and power relations and empowerment (see 
Luttrell and Quiroz 2009), out of the equation – perhaps because these aspects are more 
difficult to measure. On the other hand, the livelihoods analysis in cluster 2B appears to be 
less interested in insights from labour economists regarding the operation of labour markets, 
perhaps because the latter does not capture the powerlessness of the unemployed poor. 
Indeed, cluster 2B gives limited attention to unemployment and employment/jobs – a not 
uncommon tendency in much of the contemporary development debate (also internationally, 
cf Amsden 2010:57-9; also Wuyts 2001). 
The SALDRU/DPRU work in cluster 2A have a different emphasis than the formal-
informal segmented market model adopted in labour market work such as that of Kingdon 
and Knight (cluster 1). They focus more on the rural/urban and homeland/non-homeland 
divides. And, they do not use estimated earnings differentials as the way to prove segmenta-
tion. The PLAAS work (cluster 2B) broadens segmentation to include the concept of the 
second economy, though with important qualifications and actually a preference for the con-
cept of (non-separated) marginalisation (or ‘adverse incorporation’).  
It is clear that different disciplinary perspectives and related emphases imply a limited 
engagement with each other’s ‘worlds’.  
There also is the matter of epistemology and techniques. In line with current trends in 
economic research, the work in both clusters 1 and 2A uses highly technical econometric 
studies based on quantitative data from statistical surveys. Researchers in cluster 2B favour a 
research method that brings together quantitative and qualitative research. In addition, they 
include difficult-to-measure sociological,  psychological and political-economic dimensions 
in their analysis. Both of these may be frowned upon by economists schooled in the latest 
quantitative research techniques – cluster 2B work may be judged to be ‘a little thin’. In turn, 
somebody like Du Toit is highly critical of analytical traditions that, due to the limitations of   41
their techniques, strip the intensely human phenomena of poverty and unemployment of the 
human, social and political dimensions and thus from real understanding.  
The latter also explains why those in the livelihood/marginalisation tradition is critical of 
the neo-classical labour market model, prevalent in cluster 1 but also found in cluster 2A, as 
the foundation of analysis: it excludes dimensions perhaps most important to understanding 
unemployment and poverty. However, for researchers in cluster 1 (but likely also 2A) adher-
ence to the research traditions of standard economics probably is fundamental to the credi-
bility, amongst peers, of their research findings. (That these divisions probably occur on top 
of deeper, ideological divisions also is likely.) 
To summarise, with the risk inherent in any generalisation: With regard to a concern with 
poverty, inequality and development, those in clusters 2A and 2B appear to be relatively 
close. However, with regard to epistemology, research method and economic models (and 
perhaps ideology?), many in cluster 2A may feel a stronger affinity towards cluster 1. 
Yet there appears to be limited cross-informed debate. This impression is confirmed by a 
cursory scan of the references in papers and articles from the different discourses. Refer-
ences across discourses are limited. 
 
6.2 Key findings and messages 
 
Despite the differences, together the two clusters do provide some coherence in the picture 
they paint of the unemployment issue. There are many key themes and concerns, and some 
overlap. The following key messages can be distilled: 
1.  The South African labour market is characterised by segmentation, informal-formal and 
rural-urban dualisms, and segmentation within the informal sector (in addition to sub-
sistence and survivalist sectors). 
2.  The nature of such multi-segmentation and of the labour market linkages between 
segments – and factors enabling or disabling persons to transition to a better segment – 
may be critical to both unemployment and poverty. 
3.  A range of factors – information barriers, entry and mobility barriers (many due to the 
condition of poverty as well as marginalisation) – structurally inhibit job searching and 
entry into labour markets from a condition of poverty and from one segment to another,   42
e.g. from the survivalist/grant-use-only sector to informal jobs, or from the informal 
sector to the formal sector, or from rural to urban labour markets. 
4.  The issues cannot be separated I: 
a.  One cannot analyse and understand unemployment without talking about 
segmentation and the informal sector, and about entry and mobility barriers. 
b.  One cannot analyse unemployment without talking about poverty and household 
inequality (and vice versa). 
c.  One cannot analyse unemployment without talking about poverty conditions and 
marginalisation, subsistence and survivalism. 
d.  Likewise, one cannot analyse marginalisation and chronic poverty without talking 
about labour markets. 
5.  The issues cannot be separated II: Pensions and social grants constitute a crucial nexus 
that links poverty-marginalisation, inequality, (un)employment and macro-fiscal consid-
erations. 
6.  Gender, race, age and generational aspects influence in complex ways the causal relation-
ships surrounding issues such as vulnerability, job search, migrancy, grants and educa-
tion; these aspects need careful, nuanced analysis. 
7.  There are indications of a critical bidirectional causality surrounding the unemployment-
poverty nexus. Unemployment was seen to be one of the main causes of poverty. In 
turn, the condition of poverty (and its surrounding social and power relations) contrib-
utes to unemployment and its persistence. If this causal pattern is robust, this finding 
may contribute to understanding the phenomenon of unemployment persistence (or 
hysteresis – a prominent issue in acroeconomic research on unemployment). 
There is much to learn from ‘other’ discourses, and it would appear wise for anyone active in 
a discourse to be very open to learning from another cluster, without preconceived ideas or 
labelling. 
   43
6.3  Implications for analysis and research 
 
These findings have pertinent implications for how one may wish to think about issues such 
as the following: 
a)  The nature of dualism and segmentation and the possibility of a spectrum of segments 
(and how their existence and impact should be researched – e.g. are earnings functions 
the best way?) 
b)  How to see the secondary sector. Is it a problem sector – i.e. an aberration – or a 
promising sector for being economically productive and generating income? Is it 
competitive and market clearing, or not? 
c)  Should one focus on segmentation or on mobility barriers? What is their relationship? 
d)  How to see and integrate mobility and entry barriers into one’s analysis. Are barriers 
mostly on the labour supply side (i.e. personal, household and locational characteristics) 
or also on the labour demand side (employer characteristics) or the job market func-
tioning as such? Do these include only economic barriers or also social and power rela-
tions and psychological factors? 
e)  How to see and integrate marginalisation, exclusion and powerlessness – and thus the 
related issues of human capabilities and empowerment – into the analysis of labour markets 
and unemployment. 
f)  The nature and significance of the concept of poverty traps for unemployment analysis, 
whether such traps occur in both rural and urban settings, and how they differ between 
these contexts. 
g)  The relationship between social grants and productive economic activity (including job 
search and self-employment initiatives) in the context of marginalisation and multiple 
segments. 
h)  The relationship between education (and various categories of social, economic and job 
skills) and productive economic activity given the condition of poverty, marginalisation 
and multiple segments. 
i)  The labour demand side of the unemployment picture, which has received limited atten-
tion at a micro-economic (firm or market) level compared to the labour supply side 
(characteristics of the unemployed etc.)   44
j)  How to understand wage flexibility in the context of multiple labour market segments? 
What role do wage levels, wage flexibility and optimal labour market regulation play in 
unemployment, given a spectrum of segments and mobility barriers? 
k)  How, and how well, do labour markets function in South Africa, bearing multiple 
segments in mind? Can the concept of labour market clearing be applied in all, some or 




*   *   *   *   * 
 
 
What has not been encountered, are issues and concepts encountered in a typical macro-
economic discourse on unemployment. Neither labour market and poverty/livelihood ana-
lysts appear to consider that there may be low growth, declining-sector or cyclical factors 
relating to unemployment – not even when they compare measurements of unemployment 
from statistical surveys spanning up to 15 years. They also do not analyse, for example, 
which factors would make the poor more, or less, sensitive to cyclical shocks or policy 
measures. Neither does the concept of an equilibrium level of overall unemployment feature 
in the analyses, despite equilibrium concepts being applied in the microeconomic labour 
market analysis (with the exception of Banerjee et al (2006; 2008), who describe the increase 
in unemployment after 1995 as due to structural changes in the economy, resulting in a new 
equilibrium unemployment rate). 
This raises the question: is unemployment/poverty primarily a labour market problem 
and a development problem – or is it rather a cyclical or economic growth problem, i.e. a 
macroeconomic problem? And what would such a juxtaposition reveal? These questions will 
receive attention now, against the backdrop of information gleaned from the first and 
second discourses.    45
7.   THE MACRO/MACRO-SECTORAL DISCOURSE (CLUSTER 3) 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
This meander started at the labour market discourse, and moved on quite smoothly to the 
adjacent cluster comprising, first, a poverty-inequality sub-discourse and then the nearby 
livelihood-marginalisation sub-discourse.  
Moving to the macro-economic discourse on unemployment is not such a smooth tran-
sition. By its very nature it is a very different world, presenting an aggregate take on labour 
markets, employment and unemployment – using analyses of sectoral changes in the economy 
or aggregate analyses of output, growth, investment, trade and government expenditure, and 
also interest rates, exchange rates and inflation.
33  
Like the other two discourses, the macro- and macro-sectoral discourse has a distinctive 
terminology, frame of reference, categories and modes of analysis, and data. It often asks 
different questions. Yet it also deals with the employed, the unemployed – and the poor, if 
only indirectly.  
The macro- and macro-sectoral discourse also is the one that is reported most frequently 
in the media and gets most attention in the continual tussle between government, organised 
labour and business about growth policy, budget deficits, industrial policy, deregulation, 
exchange rates, and so forth. If not most important, it is most prominent. 
In contrast to the mass of research output in the previous two clusters, macroeconomic 
research contributions on South African unemployment are not easy to find.
34 What there is, 
is mostly about economic growth and perhaps employment. This may be surprising, given 
that macroeconomics as a discipline largely came about as a theoretical and policy response 
to sustained large-scale unemployment during the Great Depression (mainly in the work of 
Keynes, initially) – and in reaction to the Classical view that unemployment is a temporary 
                                                 
33 Many ‘macro’ contributions on (un)employment are related to inter-sectoral changes or changes in 
specific sectors, e.g. employment and output in manufacturing. While many sectoral analyses are at a 
macro level (analysing aggregated sectors of the national economy), others have a more micro focus, 
at the industry level (i.e. not firm level). Industry analyses rarely consider unemployment (which is not 
sectoral), but rather employment (which could be sectoral). This also applies to trade analyses. 
34 See, for example, the macroeconomic focus area of the HSRC’s Centre for Poverty, Employment 
and Growth (www.hsrc.ac.za/cpeg.phtml), which has only one paper on unemployment as such – a 
review paper on the unemployment-inflation relationship.   46
aberration in a self-equilibrating market system. This interest faded with the comeback and 
growing dominance of the Monetarist, New Classical and Real Business Cycle schools in the 
1980s and 1990s, in fact up to 2007/8. 
One reason for the dearth of macroeconomic research on unemployment may be the 
limited reliable unemployment data series. Compared to standard macroeconomic data, data 
series on unemployment are much shorter and have to be constructed from several surveys 
that are not fully compatible. Data problems may also explain the reluctance to incorporate 
the informal sector and discouraged workers into any macroeconomic analysis.  
While there is only a limited number of contributions in the macro-field compared to the 
labour and development fields, it is possible to position the contributions in a conceptual 
landscape, including indications of some unpopulated spaces, and so complete the discourse 
landscape diagram that was developed partially in the first paper. 
One quite general characteristic is that most of the work deals with the formal sector 
only. This is not trivial, given that informal sector workers comprise approximately 25-30% 
of all employed (Yu 2010a:25) and that between 1997 and 2003 less than 40% of the total 
number of new jobs in the economy was created by growth in formal sector employment 
(Casale et al 2004:988). 
It is useful to distinguish two sub-discourses, of which the second is by far the largest. 
The first deals with a macroanalysis of unemployment as such. The second deals with un-
employment indirectly, within the context of employment, economic growth and sectoral 
shifts. 
 
7.2  Sub-discourse 3A (unemployment analysis): From unemployment to macro-
economic equilibrium  
 
(a)  On an increasing NAIRU  
Banerjee et al (2006; 2008) provide an interesting ‘bridge’ between labour market analysis 
and macroeconomic analysis. While most of the paper belongs to the labour market dis-
course (cluster 1) it is noted here because their conceptual framework is anchored in the 
concept of an equilibrium level of aggregate unemployment. This is the point of departure in 
standard macroeconomic models, with the NAIRU usually seen as the long-run equilibrium 
unemployment level (whether stationary or varying – see below).    47
Their main question is how the large increase in the rate of unemployment since 1995 
should be understood. Was it a short-term deviation from this level due to temporary 
shocks, and is the rate of unemployment liable to a return to the previous long-run, equi-
librium without intervention? Or was it a change in the long-run rate of unemployment? 
Banerjee et al conclude that the entire secular movement in unemployment between 1994 
and  2005 can be accounted for by changes in labour force participation (2006:18-19).  
In addition, the data confirm persistent labour shedding by mining and agriculture since 
1970. For 1970-2005, total employment had an annualized growth rate of 1.3 percent per 
year while the working-age population grew at 2.7 percent per year. Stagnating labour 
demand thus played a significant role, over a long time, in the growing unemployment 
problem.  
Thus their analysis indicates the following structural changes: the transition of the mining 
sector to lower labour-intensity methods and a similar decline in agricultural employment 
(both causing a fall in the demand for unskilled labour) and, more recently, a massive influx 
of female labour supply into the labour force after 1994. These are unlikely to be reversed or 
reversible. An apparent decrease in job search effectiveness may also have increased the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment (2006:47). 
Thus, the rise in unemployment in South Africa since 1994 has been due to structural 
changes in the economy and amounts to an increase in the long-run equilibrium rate of un-
employment. This problem mostly will not be self-correcting (2006:6). 
Schoeman et al (2008) also focus on whether the long-run equilibrium rate has increased. 
They analyse the movement of the rate of unemployment for 1970-1982 and 1983-2002. In 
the first period, unemployment fluctuated around a mean of approximately 8%, displaying 
mean-reverting behaviour. In the second period, no such behaviour is apparent. The rate of 
unemployment displays a clear upward trend, defying the idea of a return to a stable long-run 
equilibrium rate of unemployment.  
Structural changes appear to have occurred. In this period the rate of unemployment was 
not mean-reverting. Time-series analysis shows that hysteresis is present (the series has a unit 
root): an increase in actual unemployment leads to an increase in the long-term equilibrium 
rate of unemployment. There is no return to a stable, exogenously determined, natural rate 
of unemployment. This explains the current and likely future persistence of high rates of un-
employment.   48
It also implies that the long-run rate of unemployment has been endogenously deter-
mined, at least since 1983. They estimate a cointegrating vector  that underlies long-run un-
employment in South Africa. Determinants of long-run unemployment include institutional 
as well as economic factors (2008:80). The important variables are the interest rate (posi-
tive/upward impact) and the fixed capital stock (negative impact). Others, with statistically 
less significant impacts, are the degree of unionisation and the real effective exchange rate 
(both with an upward impact on unemployment). (Labour force growth was not considered.) 
 
(b)  On cyclical unemployment and Okun’s law 
Marinkov and Geldenhuys (2007) investigate the existence of Okun’s law in South Africa, i.e. 
whether unemployment in South Africa responds inversely to cyclical changes in aggregate 
output, in light of the persistently high unemployment rates despite high GDP growth rates 
in the long upswing after 1994.
35  
They first calculate unemployment-growth elasticities for five-year periods between 1971 
and 2005 – and find the expected negative elasticity only for 1971-1975 and 2001-2005. In 
the other five-year periods employment growth indeed was associated with economic 
growth, but the latter was not sufficiently high to absorb a growing labour force (amidst 
growing labour productivity). Thus unemployment could still increase. For 2001-2005 the 
elasticity value is -0.11, which indicates that, although the rate of unemployment did respond 
‘correctly’ to changes in real GDP, the response was fairly weak. Very high GDP growth 
rates would be required to decrease the rate of unemployment significantly, given normal 
labour force and productivity growth. 
The authors isolate cyclical unemployment and output via detrending of annual data. 
This shows that the cyclical component of total unemployment has become smaller over the 
period, and did not exceed 15% from 1991 onwards. (Both formal and informal sector 
employment are included in the data.) 
They estimate Okun’s coefficient for South Africa for the period 1970-2005 in terms of 
the output gap and the unemployment gap, i.e. the gap between observed and poten-
tial/natural unemployment. They unambiguously find a statistically significant negative 
Okun-type relationship between cyclical output and cyclical unemployment (2007:389).  
                                                 
35 Okun’s law refers to a persistent inverse relationship between cyclical output and cyclical 
unemployment over the course of the business cycle.   49
The authors find that a 1% increase in the output gap (i.e. in real GDP above potential 
GDP) is associated with a decrease in cyclical unemployment of between 0.16 and 0.77 per-
centage points (2007:388). Much higher coefficients were found for the medium run, indi-
cating an average 60% stronger reaction in the medium run. The potency of aggregate 
demand to influence cyclical unemployment obviously depends on the magnitude of the 
reaction. 
 
7.3    Sub-discourse 3B (Macro/macro-sectoral): Economic growth, employment and 
wages 
 
(a)  On growth, employment and jobless growth 
Hodge (2009) analyses the statistical relationship between economic growth rates and formal 
employment over time, using a constructed annual time series data of total formal sector 
employment for the period 1946-2007, and six-year moving averages. Hodge calculates the 
employment coefficient, i.e. the ratio of employment growth to economic growth. (A value 
below zero would indicate jobless growth.) For the period 1946-2007 the value fluctuated 
around an average value of roughly 0.5.
36 This means that economic growth leads to formal 
sector employment growth of only half the real GDP growth rate. 
The period of employment decline in the uncertain early 1990s was a clear outlier. The 
employment coefficient dropped precipitously to as low as -1.7 for 1994, indicating jobless 
growth:  for the six uncertain years up to 1994, the real economic growth rate averaged 0.5% 
and the employment growth rate -0.8% (Hodge 2009:498). However, subsequently the 
employment coefficient returned to its long-term value of approximately 0.5, which indicates 
that jobless growth is not a long-term characteristic of the South African economy. 
His results show a substantial increase in formal sector employment from 1995 up to 
2007. Thus the rising rate of unemployment since the middle 1990s was not due to a histori-
cally deficient growth or employment performance of the economy (2009:502). The cause 
derives not from the demand or absorption side of the economy, but from the labour supply 
                                                 
36  Marinkov and Geldenhuys (2007:376) estimate employment elasticities for five-year periods 
between 1971 and 2005. They find much variation in the value, perhaps because they did not apply 
smoothing and used five-year periods. The results show a decline since the mid-1980’s, i.e. from 3.33 
in 1981-1985 to 0.45 in 2001-2005.   50
side, specifically the large increase in the labour force since the mid 1990s, as “previously 
discouraged workers are attracted by increasing job opportunities in an expanding economy” 
(2009:501). Similar incentives may also attract more migrants from African countries, e.g. 
Zimbabwe.  
An employment coefficient of 0.5 might be regarded as “woefully inadequate” under 
conditions of large-scale unemployment, but is not easy to raise. While growth may pick up 
in the medium term, “the prospects for a sustained lowering of the … high rates of un-
employment depend mostly on future changes in the labour force. Only if labour force 
growth continues to moderate can we reasonably expect further declines in the rates of un-
employment” (2009:502). South Africa simply has too many people in the workforce. 
This conclusion can sound cold-blooded – as if he is saying that all the discouraged 
workers and those in the informal sector should just stop wanting to work. However, it 
captures an important implication of the employment coefficient: formal sector growth 
alone is unlikely to absorb sufficient numbers of people to reduce unemployment rates 
significantly (see footnote 18 below). 
 
(b)  Digression: On estimating the output elasticity of employment 
Estimating the output elasticity is an area of debate, both micro- and macroeconomic. Many 
researchers have estimated it and significant variation characterise the results. Data coverage 
(whether agriculture is included, whether the informal sector is included, etc.) makes a differ-
ence. It also depends whether simple elasticities are calculated from annual changes, or 
whether an elasticity is estimated econometrically from a labour demand function, and 
whether from panel or time series data. 
An early estimate is an elasticity value of 0.29, estimated by Fields et al (1999:14) from a 
standard labour demand equation in a (non-agricultural formal private sector) cross-sectoral 
study. These were estimates for 1980-89 – with the period 1990-98 producing insignificant 
estimates. This  again suggests that it may have been a transitional period with uncommon 
economic behaviour (see footnote 9 below). However, dividing 1990-1998 into two sub-
periods surprisingly provides much higher estimates of approximately 0.85, both statistically 
significant (Fields et al 1999:17). This is quite puzzling.   51
Oosthuizen (2006:9) calculates a simple output elasticity of non-agricultural formal 
employment from 1970, as follows:  
1970-1980   0.76 
1980-1990   0.49 
1990-1996 -0.55 
1997-2002 -1.29 
These correspond with a detailed analysis of the Hodge results (but still interprets the 1990s 
as a declining trend rather than possibly a decade-long aberration that may have normalised 
after 2000).  
He also calculates a simple output elasticity of total (formal and informal) employment of 
0.76 for the period 1995 to 2004 (2006:10). Altman (2008:S143), presenting revisions to 
employment data and trends between 1995 and 2006, finds Oosthuizen’s value ‘extremely 
high by global standards’ in both developed and developing countries. From her revised 
formal-plus-informal employment data the simple employment elasticity is estimated to be in 
the interval 0.45-0.66, depending on the period and data source. She also notes separate 
elasticities for formal employment (0.66) and informal employment (0.24) for a time period 
with an overall elasticity of 0.5. (The relevant period is the same as Oosthuizen’s and shorter 
than that of Fedderke and of Moolman, below.) 
Severe variation in sectoral estimates also is common, even from the same author. From 
an estimated labour usage function, Fedderke and Mariotti (2002:860), using panel data, 
report a value of 0.86-1.0 for the output elasticity of employment for the manufacturing 
sector for 1970-97. In another exercise,  Fedderke produces a manufacturing value of 1.18 
(2004:87). For the three mining sub-sectors he gets values of 0.90, 0.31 and 2.26, and in a 
different exercise for the entire mining sector, a value of 3.02 (2004:73; 87). 
Moolman (2003:11), using industry-level time-series analysis,
37 finds an average output 
elasticity for mining of 0.63 and 0.57 for manufacturing. Values for manufacturing sub-
sectors are bunched around this average, but the lowest is 0.28 and the highest 0.86. Sectors 
                                                 
37 Moolman (2003:9) argues that the employment relationships are too heterogeneous to justify the 
use of panel data techniques. In particular, the occurrence of structural breaks in many of the series 
and relationships that are different in nature and timing implies that the cointegration vectors are 
different. This would make the use of panel data techniques, such as used by Fedderke and Mariotti 
(2002), inappropriate.   52
with values above unity are: building construction and engineering (1.34), business services 
(1.94) and general government services (1.07). 
Output elasticities have also been estimated for different employee skills levels. Mool-
man (2003: 12-15) finds ascending values of 0.49, 0.87 and 1.19 for semi- and unskilled, 
skilled, and highly skilled respectively.  Fedderke (2004:92) produces a sharp V-pattern with  
values of 2.1-3.1, 0.8-1.4, and 5.5 respectively. 
 
(c)  On growth constraints, wage elasticity and employment  
Fedderke, aided by various students and colleagues, has been a prolific researcher on various 
aspects of growth. Some papers relate to explaining decreases in employment in the formal 
economy. It is worth perusing them to characterise the approach and distil insights relevant 
to the unemployment discourse. 
Although the focus frequently is on the decline in output growth in the 1990s, Fedderke 
notes (2004:9-15) that the GDP growth rate has been on a long-term structural decline since 
the early 1970s. Formal sector employment expanded from 1970 to 1989 (though at a 
declining rate), and then started to fall in absolute terms at a growth rate of -1.15% in 1990-
98.
38 In the latter period, employment in the mining sector shrank by -6.4% per annum; 
manufacturing, agriculture and services all shed labour at approximately -1% p.a. 
Viewing the growth rate of output and the level of employment as the two “fundamental 
indicators of the South African rate of development” (2004:9), Fedderke sets out to identify 
factors that constrain growth in South Africa. His concern with the labour market is not un-
employment as such, but that poor labour market performance may constitute a structural 
constraint on economic growth (implying a certain causality from the labour market to GDP 
growth). Consequently his approach is via a decomposition of output growth in the 1990s 
(up to 1997) into the relative contributions of labour, capital and technology (based on a 
neoclassical production function and perfectly competitive factor markets).
39 This  identifies 
the labour market as a problem area, having contributed the least, and indeed negatively, to 
GDP growth (2004:19; 2002:626). This is true for all four principal sectors of the SA econ-
omy.  
                                                 
38 See Hodge (2009) for an analysis of the recovery of employment after 1998. 
39 Fedderke (2002:618) recognises that the latter assumption “may be inappropriate particularly in 
South Africa”, and also note other limitations of the decomposition technique (2002:616-23; 642).   53
This evidence leads Fedderke to ask: “What is it about the labour market that has led to 
the decline in employment creation, and hence to a virtual absence of labour as a positive 
contributor to output growth in South Africa?” (2004:22; also see 2006:15).
40   
The presumed problem of labour markets is then handled under the heading of market 
distortions and inefficiencies, where “the lack of attention paid to the mispricing and hence 
resource misallocation, as well as the labour market rigidities that characterise South African 
labour markets is astonishing” (2004:56; also see 2006:15).  
A central fact is that the wage elasticity of employment in South Africa has time and 
again been found to be negative. Fedderke and his associates set out to highlight that real 
wages matter in observed employment trends – in particular that excessive increases in real 
wages was a major cause of the decline in formal sector employment in the 1990s.
41 
The basic evidence shows, for example, that in the 1990s mining employment declined 
amidst growing output – and increasing real remuneration (2004:56-8; Fedderke and Pirouz 
2002:13). Thus a plausible hypothesis is that rising real labour cost may have contributed to 
declining employment in the mining sector. Since “economic theory would anticipate that 
perfect labour markets would serve to equalize the marginal product of labour to the 
marginal cost of labour”, changes in labour productivity is another possible explanation for 
changing employment trends (Fedderke 2004:65). Improved skills levels  may also be rele-
vant. 
Fedderke turns to econometric evidence, i.e. a labour requirements function derived by 
inverting a standard Cobb-Douglas production function. It shows employment as a function 
of output, the capital stock and the real wage (2004:71-2). The results show wage elasticities 
                                                 
40 Fedderke estimates the labour contribution to output growth in the 1990s at -0.58%. Other esti-
mates for longer and shorter periods between 1980 and 2005, e.g. Arora (2005:15) and Du Plessis 
and Smit (2007:13), all show a consistently positive (though perhaps declining) contribution from 
labour to GDP growth of between 0.6 and 0.9 per cent (and sometimes higher than capital). 
Fedderke’s value for the 1980s is within this range, but his negative value for 1990-1997 is far outside 
it. The transition period around 1994 may have been an abnormal period, with formal sector em-
ployment quite unstable, as noted by Hodge (2009:497) when explaining the out-of-sorts employ-
ment coefficient in that same period. On these grounds there does not appear to be a general prob-
lem with the labour market, and his conclusion might have been premature.  
41 Mazumdar and Van Seventer (2002) provide a decomposition analysis that shows how the gains 
from output is distributed between real wage growth and employment growth. In contrast to the 
1970s and 1980s, the 1990s show a clear trend favouring wage growth rather than employment ex-
pansion. This is an economy-wide phenomenon, e.g. for tradeable as well as non-tradeable, for 
labour- and capital-intensive manufacturing, etc. They do not, however, provide explanations for 
these trends.   54
for the three mining subsectors (coal, gold and uranium, diamond mining) of -0.44, -0.69 and 
-1.45 respectively. (When they control for the skills ratio, the real wage elasticities remain 
negative.) Thus, in addition to falling demand for mining output, the cost of labour has been 
an additional source of job loss (2004:75). 
A slightly different labour usage equation for manufacturing, estimated from panel data
42 
on the 28 subsectors (2004:80-1; Fedderke and Mariotti 2002:858-62), produces a real wage 
elasticity between -0.5 and -0.55. (These estimates do not control for a changing skills com-
position.) These values are lower than other published estimates, -0.7 being the most quoted 
general wage elasticity;
43 Rodrik (2006:17) reports an elasticity with respect to (skill-adjusted) 
labour costs of -0.6 for manufacturing.  
Whatever the exact elasticity may be, Fedderke and Mariotti (2002:848) point out that, 
wherever a subsector had a decline in employment, it also had a strong negative correlation 
between employment and real labour remuneration. 
Wage elasticities may show substantial variation across sectors. Some, like mining,
44 
wholesale and retail trade, construction, community services, and domestic households, 
appear to have high elasticities (larger than -1). Agriculture, electricity and gas, and financial 
services have medium elasticities (-0.4 to -0.8), general government as well as transport 
appear to have low wage elasticities (below -0.15).
45 
Fedderke also notes that unskilled workers may face very different wage elasticities than 
the aggregate labour force (2004:86). He finds a much higher wage elasticity for unskilled 
workers (approximately -2.0) than for skilled workers (-0.46), estimated at a high level of 
                                                 
42 See footnote 6. 
43 Most calculations of employment elasticity in South Africa indicate that the labour demand curve is 
relatively elastic, with estimates typically ranging from -0.66 to -0.85 (Nattrass 2004:91; Fields et al 
1999:5). This is higher than values for OECD countries of -0.2 to -0.5 (OECD 2007:132) or the 
range of -0.15 to -0.75 for most other studies noted by Hamermesh (1996:81-92; 135). Fields et al 
(1999:17) produce a best estimate of around -0.5.  
44 The estimated wage elasticity value for mining here is -2.20, which seems very high given the values 
obtained for the mining subsectors earlier. 
45 In this particular labour requirements function, manufacturing has a value of -0.39, but it is not 
statistically significant. To solve this puzzle, Fedderke reports on a manufacturing sector labour re-
quirements function that is more fully specified by including trade openness and capacity utilization, 
for instance. It uses the factor price ratio rather than the real wage and produces an estimated coeffi-
cient of -1.97, which is interpreted as the real wage elasticity (Fedderke, Shin and Vaze 2003:38; 
Fedderke 2005:22). Given the variation in his estimated elasticities for manufacturing, the use of the 
factor price ratio, and the estimated value being much out of line with international estimates, also 
for developing countries, the estimate may need to be treated with some caution.    55
aggregation for the aggregate formal sector (2004:91). The very high value for unskilled 
workers falls far outside the ‘normal’ range for South Africa.
46 Indeed, Behar (2004), using 
firm-level data and translog cost functions, reports wage elasticities for skill groups in the 
South African manufacturing sector as follows: 
Managerial/professional:   -0.56 
Skilled/artisan     -0.56 
Semi-skilled     -0.80 
Unskilled     -0.65 
These seem to confirm the conventional range of estimates. 
Despite all the complexities and difficulties in estimating wage elasticities,
47 and some 
suspect values, there is a clear pattern of relatively high negative real wage elasticities in the 
South African economy, with higher values for less-skilled labour likely. For Fedderke, the 
latter is crucial: 
(T)he wage elasticity of unskilled labour in the formal sector of the economy is particularly 
dramatic. It remains an abiding puzzle why the SA Department of Labour has not recog-
nized the wage rate as a means of alleviating poverty amongst population groups who stand 
to benefit most from real wage cuts (2004:93-4; also see 2006:17).  
To find the culprit for the poor contribution to employment growth is not difficult: “Wage 
moderation has been insufficiently practiced” (2004:98; compare Rodrik below).  
Another derived result comes from an analysis of a possible relationship between (a) the 
correlation between real remuneration and labour productivity, and (b) employment growth 
rates. Industries where the real wage is less closely linked to real labour productivity (correla-
tion below 0.7) tend to have lower growth in employment. Only where there is a strong 
positive correlation between growth in real labour remuneration and growth in labour pro-
ductivity (correlation above 0.8) do economic sectors in South Africa create jobs on a sus-
                                                 
46 It may be significant that in a later paper Fedderke himself (2010:16), when referring to elasticities 
that can be higher than -0.7 and even greater than -1, does not mention these higher values of around 
-2. Also see the previous footnote. 
47 By only estimating a labour demand function and not also a labour supply function, implicitly these 
approaches assume that labour supply is either perfectly elastic (or perfectly inelastic). Without such 
an assumption, labour demand would not be identified (see Hamermesh 1996:70-74). Both of these 
assumptions effectively assume the problem of unemployment away or restricts the ‘problem’ to vol-
untary unemployment. The input demand function also assumes profit maximising firms in perfectly 
competitive labour markets at a point where wages are market clearing. For a South African multi-
equation model with both labour demand and labour supply, see Du Toit and Koekemoer (2003).   56
tainable basis (Fedderke 2006:16). This suggests “the presence of a declining employment 
creating capacity in sectors as they conform less closely to the dictates of standard economic 
theory” (Fedderke and Mariotti 2002:853). From this they conclude:  
“…‘well-functioning’ labour markets, defined as those that link factor rewards to factor pro-
ductivity in accordance with economic theory, appear to be more likely to generate both 
employment, and sustained improvements in labour remuneration. In effect, to the extent 
that by labour market flexibility we mean the capacity of labour markets to adjust freely and 
rapidly to the market clearing wage suggested by labour productivity, the evidence … sug-
gests that labour market flexibility is desirable.” (Fedderke and Mariotti 2002:854).48 
This illustrates the line of argument towards a conclusion on the unqualified desirability 
of labour market flexibility. In this view, labour markets are constrained because wage 
adjustments are inadequate in clearing the market (thereby eliminating voluntary unemploy-
ment). The consequence for the economy is a continued high unemployment rate. Inappro-
priate pricing of labour is linked to rising levels of labour market rigidity (Fedderke 2010:26) 
– inter alia due to labour market regulation, which has led to poor employment growth in the 
economy. 
“It has also disadvantaged the large pool of unemployed who remain excluded from the 
benefits of the formal economy. … It is time, therefore, to revisit labor market regulation … 
(to) allow more flexible and faster labor absorption for small and medium-size firms. The 
objective must be to allow the poor … access to employment under labor market regulation 
that is less onerous on the employer and offers more chances of employment to job seekers 
(Fedderke 2005:32). 
A contrary finding on wage costs comes from Rodrik (2006), from the Harvard Centre 
for International Development and a member of the ASGISA panel. He provides results 
that suggest that the decline in formal sector employment in the 1990s was not due to in-
creasing real wages (i.e. wage-push). The deeper cause lies elsewhere (as discussed in 
subsection (d) below). 
While the level of South African wages (in the formal sector) are quite high by the stan-
dards of countries at similar income levels, in general real wages have not risen much, if at 
all, since the transition to democracy (Rodrik 2006:2). The role of unions seems to have been 
mostly to prevent the real wages of their members from falling. 
                                                 
48 At a market-clearing equilibrium in a perfectly competitive labour market the real wage (marginal 
cost) equals the marginal product of labour.   57
Rodrik analyses real remuneration per employee in manufacturing (which has increased 
steeply in the 1990s). Using a two-phase regression procedure, he decomposes the increase 
into (a) a part due to skills-upgrading, i.e. changing skills composition due to an increasing 
proportion of skilled and highly skilled workers, and (b) a part due to wage-push. The latter 
component, i.e. skill-adjusted real labour costs, actually fell significantly during the 1990s 
(2006:15; 45). Therefore, excessive real wage increases cannot explain, or have caused, the 
decline in manufacturing employment. 
Given his own estimate of the real wage elasticity of -0.6, Rodrik is not saying that 
employment would not react to real wage changes. His contrary finding compared to Fed-
derke is a factual one, based on a different calculation of changes in real labour costs in the 
1990s. Nevertheless, Rodrik rejects real wages cuts as an option to reduce unemployment, 
given the social and political context (2006:10). As Pollin et al (2006: 27) note, real wage 
increases of semi- and unskilled workers from 1970 onwards were from an extremely low 
base, reflecting underlying racial earnings inequalities, and “still leave African workers only 
modestly above a reasonable poverty line”. 
To complicate the empirical issues, Kingdon and Knight show that in 2003-7 employ-
ment grew (unemployment fell significantly) while real mean earnings of formal sector 
employees rose annually by 4%, and those of informal employees by 8.8% (2008:318-9). This 
could mean that real wages did not have much of an effect in that period, that the employ-
ment gain would have been larger had real wages not increased, or that other causal factors 
have dominated. Kingdon and Knight also argue that, given the estimated elasticities, greater 
wage flexibility would have been unable to prevent the increase in unemployment in the 
1990s (2007:823). 
Banerjee et al (2006: 24; 31-2) similarly notes a 10% decline in real wages for 1995-2005, 
and the absence of evidence that the increase in unemployment was driven by wage growth 
– despite a large and growing union wage premium. Edwards and Golub (2004) show that 
South Africa’s relative real unit cost of labour has decreased significantly vis-à-vis other 
countries 1970-98 mostly due to relative wage movements (rather than productivity gains) – 
but effectively these movements were due to currency depreciation, not the real wage as 
such). 
Related is the conclusion of Kingdon and Knight (2008:302) that the increased un-
employment in late 1990s was not primarily due to wage rigidities, but due to abnormal in-  58
creases in the labour force. Of course, a Fedderke-type analysis is not trying to explain un-
employment, but rather the decline in formal sector employment, which leaves labour force 
increases out of the analysis.  
Du Plessis and Smit (2007:14) remind us that the evidence on real wages remains 
ambiguous, that some researchers find both increases and decreases in real wages in the 
period 1995 to 2003 from different data sources, while others find that real wages were 
largely stagnant during this period. Linking employment and unemployment episodes in 
South Africa to real wage changes is, and has been,
49 fraught with difficulties. These may 
include the impact of various types of segmentation as well as labour market entry mobility 
barriers. 
 
(d)  On sectoral shifts, employment and unemployment 
Rodrik (2006) also provides a different approach to analysing the causes and nature of un-
employment. It entails a sectoral analysis of shifts in formal sectoral employment patterns, 
e.g. manufacturing versus services, or tradeables versus non-tradeables – taking note of their 
unskilled-labour intensities. 
Formal employment stagnated during the 1990s, with the share of semi- and low-skilled 
workers stable at approximately 42% of formal sector employment (2006:8). However, the 
relative constancy of total employment hides large structural changes. Employment in trade-
able activities (mining, agriculture and manufacturing) has dropped from 45% to 30% of 
total formal employment from 1970 to 2004. In particular, the decline in agricultural and 
mining employment has not been compensated by an increase in manufacturing employ-
ment. South Africa has actually deindustrialized in the past thirty years (2006:5-6).
50 In con-
trast, employment in private non-tradeable activities (financial services, construction, trade, 
                                                 
49 For an earlier dispute on this issue, see MERG (1993:152-4) which rejects IMF and World Bank 
views (e.g. Fallon 1992) that excessive increases in real wages have been the main cause of low em-
ployment growth. MERG attributes the latter to inadequate growth in aggregate demand and labour 
force education in previous decades: “International comparative evidence supports the MERG ar-
gument that in growing economies, real wages and employment are not inversely related … employ-
ment is a function of aggregate demand and output, rather than of wage flexibility in the labour mar-
ket” (1993:154). Of course, such an effect depends on the magnitude of the employment coefficient 
(see discussion of this issue in section 2.3.(b) above). 
50 In terms of employment as a share of the labour force, manufacturing’s share has declined from 
almost 15% in 1976 to approximately 7% in 2002. Manufactured exports as share of GDP has 
doubled in this period, but only to a still low level of 12%.   59
retail, transport, etc.) has increased from 25 to 37%, approximately. Manufacturing has lost 
ground to the tertiary sector. 
This restructuring in macro-sectoral employment has had major implications for the 
employment of low- and unskilled workers – and thus for unemployment, which is heavily 
concentrated amongst the unskilled (also see Fedderke 2004:13). This is because the de-
clining sectors – the tradeable sectors – have been the most low-skill intensive parts of the 
economy. By 2004 more than 70% (60% for manufacturing) of tradeable employees were 
low- and skilled workers, as against only 25% for private non-tradeable (2006:2-3; 8).  
For all activities these percentages were much lower than in 1970 or even 1990. In addi-
tion, production techniques in manufacturing and the other tradeable sectors have become 
more capital-intensive (2006:10).
51 
The structural change away from the most low-skills intensive parts, i.e. tradeable and 
especially manufacturing, needs to be understood if one wishes to understand unemploy-
ment and employment trends. Using panel regressions of sectoral employment functions, 
Rodrik decomposes employment changes according to cause. The bottom line that emerges 
(2006:18; 48) for manufacturing employment for the decade since 1994 is that:  
  The decline in the average price index of manufacturing (relative to the other sectors) 
– causing a fall of approximately 30% in relative profitability – is the predominant 
cause of the decline in manufacturing employment. This factor alone accounts for 
more than 143% percent of the total employment reduction. (A partial cause of the 
decline in manufacturing prices is intensified import competition (import penetra-
tion), in the broader context of trade openness and globalisation.) 
  Skill-biased technical change is the second most important contributor (78%). 
                                                 
51 The impact of trade liberalization on employment has received some attention in the South African 
trade literature. A SALDRU publication (2006) on its Trade and Poverty Project reflects most of the 
debate. A chapter by Dunne and Edwards (2006) provides evidence that the net impact of trade 
liberalization 1994-2003 was more-or-less zero (including only direct effects of changes in exports 
and imports) – although definite sectoral shifts occurred. Capital-intensive sectors were positively 
affected and labour-intensive sectors negatively. If indirect effects (e.g. backward linkages) are 
included, the net effect on aggregate employment appears to have been positive – but with relatively 
more skilled jobs created than semi- and unskilled jobs (2006:8). A CGE modelling exercise by 
Thurlow (2006) confirms employment increases for all skills groups if both direct and indirect effects 
are included – but with skilled employment expanding fastest (2006:9). The decline in manufacturing 
employment during the 1990s also is explained by trade liberalization (2006:11). In a separate project, 
Ngandu (2008), using a CGE analysis of the impact of exchange rate appreciation on employment, 
finds a positive net effect.   60
  TFP (total factor productivity) growth have made a comparatively small contribution 
to the decline in employment (around 11%), while  
  The drop in skill-adjusted remuneration costs (the wage-push element) has prevented 
manufacturing employment from falling even further (-113%). This underscores and 
quantifies the perhaps contra-intuitive finding already noted above. 
A decline in real wages for low-skilled workers is unlikely to be an option to reduce un-
employment, given political constraints – while the informal sector is unlikely to absorb sig-
nificantly larger numbers of unskilled job seekers (2006:10-11). Manufacturing sector growth 
is the only option, with export-oriented and profitability-enhancing strategies indicated. 
Ironically, since manufacturing is relatively low-skill intensive, if such a strategy is successful 
the perceived problem of a skills shortage as a constraint on economic growth will largely 
disappear (2006:9). 
Hausman (2008), in the final recommendations of the ASGISA panel, takes this argu-
ment further. The only real option for addressing the South African unemployment problem 
is increasing exports of non-mineral tradeables, which are intensive in low-skilled labour. 
They recommend depreciation in the real exchange rate as the remedy for an ailing manu-
facturing sector, rather than expanding domestic demand, which will lead to current account 
problems. They conclude on an optimistic note: 
“Accelerating structural transformation is strategic for South Africa not only because mining 
has been falling in per capita terms for decades, but also because the faster development of 
new high productivity tradeable activities will create jobs that can pay decent wages, so that 
full employment can be achieved without a major decline in wages at the bottom of the pay 
scale” (2008:11). 
Here one needs to note that their analysis applies to the formal sector and to strictly defined 
unemployment. The reference to full employment suggests that there is no room in their 
frame of reference for discouraged workers and structural (i.e. non-frictional) long-term un-
employment. 
 
(e)  Comprehensive reports sponsored by international organizations  
International researchers sponsored by international organisations have also been active in 
researching the South African economy. They have tended to focus on a range of issues 
simultaneously.   61
Lewis (2002) provides a synthesis from World Bank analyses of various aspects of the 
South African economy. Although not an official World Bank publication, it provides insight 
into the typical approach at this institution. 
Noting the development goals of promoting sustainable livelihoods, improving social 
conditions and alleviating poverty (2002:325), his approach is characterised by three points 
of departure: (a) a focus on investment and job creation, with economic growth as key policy 
objective, (b) identifying constraints on growth, and (c) the legacy of apartheid as manifested 
in “pervasive distortions in factor markets”, including labour (2002:726). Thus there is a pre-
sumption that unemployment is the consequence of distortions in the labour market, and 
that these distortions are political-historical in nature.  
Regarding the formal sector,
52 he considers labour market regulation and labour market 
flexibility. He quotes from a 1999 survey of CEOs of large firms regarding constraints on 
investment and growth. The impact of the new labour regulations was 4
th on the list – fol-
lowing crime, the cost of capital and credit, and exchange rate volatility.  
While 40% of firms said regulations caused them to employ fewer workers, 60% percent 
said the combined labour legislation had no cumulative impact on employment decisions 
(2002:748). Almost 30% said that labour relations had been improved, and 15% said the 
regulations helped raise labour productivity (2002:734). For SMMEs, the four main con-
straints on expansion did not include any labour issues (2002: 739-40). The ambivalent views 
show “how difficult it is to disentangle the effects of labour legislation and regulation from 
underlying economic and industry trends” (2002:734). 
He concludes that the new labour legislation “does at least appear to contribute to an 
impression of inflexibility” (2002:747), and undoubtedly “along some margin, perhaps fairly 
wide, labour market institutions and regulations have constrained more rapid growth in 
employment” (2002:748). However, he finds it hard to imagine that inflexibility could 
account for African unemployment rates above 30%, or that greater flexibility would double 
African employment (2002:748-9).
53 
                                                 
52 Interesting is his view that having a ‘stunted’ informal sector and a relatively small agricultural sec-
tor means that South Africa is missing two standard labour ‘shock absorbers’ that operate in other 
economies (especially in Africa) during periods of adjustment (2002:728).  
53 Lewis also refers to the ILO review (Standing et al) which downplays the impact of regulations on 
employment, and an earlier World Bank document (Fallon and Lucas 1996) which had an opposite 
view.   62
As for the impact of wage inflexibility, he presents a diagram showing broadly parallel 
upward trends of real remuneration and unemployment for lower-skilled labour from 1970–
1999. The lower-skilled unemployment rate increased from approximately 12% to approxi-
mately 56%. Real remuneration per unskilled and semi-skilled worker grew by approximately 
250%. The broadly parallel movement in the unemployment and wage data “supports the 
neo-classical conclusion that unskilled and semi-skilled labour has to a large extent been 
priced out of the market” (2002: 746). 
Lewis qualifies his findings by noting that the evidence on the impact of labour market 
regulations is quite mixed, that a complex issue such as the relationship between real wages 
and unemployment cannot be analysed with visual patterns, and that wage inflexibility in any 
case cannot explain the extent of unemployment in South Africa (2002: 773-4). 
Pollin et al (2006), in a report sponsored by the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme, propose an employment-targeted economic programme. Although expressly policy-
oriented, it provides contrasting perspectives on the causes of “the problem of mass un-
employment”. They highlight both supply and demand side causes.  
On the demand side, Pollin et al (2006:10) highlight two factors impacting on low 
employment growth. First, low GDP growth: at approximately 4% it is too low to be a 
major “engine of employment growth". Secondly, and most importantly: a significant decline 
in labour intensity between 1994 and 2001 – a sudden decline of 4% p.a. in contrast to the 
long-term trend of -1% for 1967-2001. The provide the following numbers: 
  In the entire period 1967-2001 there was a gradual drop from 8.2 formal economy 
workers per R1m output in 1967 to 4.9 in 2001 – a total of 40% in 44 years.  
  However, in 1994-2001 there was a drop of 28%: “In just seven years, formal econ-
omy businesses in South Africa were hiring nearly 30 percent fewer people for a 
given amount of goods and services they produced” (2006:10). 
This occurred especially in mining and manufacturing, and mainly due to mechanisation and 
new labour-saving technology in the context of global competition. The impact on employ-
ment growth, and thus unemployment, must have been huge. 
On the supply side their focus is on labour costs. Here they differ strongly from the 
argument that excessive real wages combined with a relatively high negative real wage elas-
ticity of labour demand, are – together with labour market regulations – at the root of the 
unemployment problem.   63
Referring to work of Lewis as well as Fallon and Lucas (1996), they argue that the evi-
dence linking mass unemployment to high labour costs, especially relative to countries that 
are South Africa’s trade competitors,  is “not persuasive”. The point out that Lewis’s number 
of 250% real wage growth in 1970-1999 for semi- and unskilled workers (noted above) is 
based on extrapolation from an extremely small sample (2006:26). Referring to a Fallon and 
Lucas (1996) estimate of a -0.71 wage elasticity for black employees, they point out that the 
impact elasticity is only -0.156, implying that any adjustment of employment to wage changes 
is quite slow.  
They also find conclusions of Edwards and Golub (2004) relating to exports and labour 
costs problematic. The latter show evidence of a strong downward trend in relative unit 
labour costs in manufacturing (relative to a large number of trade partner countries) for 
1970-98, but also that these costs still end up above those of a subgroup of (competitor) 
developing countries. In the reading of Pollin et al (2006:25), Edwards and Golub 
(2004:1330;1336) downplay the former and highlight the latter, choosing to stress that high 
labour costs possibly still are contributing to slow export growth and thus low employment 
growth. 
On market rigidities due to unionization and labour regulation, they point to Lewis’s 
ambiguous findings in this regard (noted above), plus the fact that any rigidities imposed by 
unionization at most affects businesses employing roughly 10% of South Africa’s labour 
force (2006:29).  
Therefore: “It is fair to conclude that, based on this evidence, the argument that exces-
sive wages and labour market rigidities are one of the primary causes, if not the primary 
cause, of mass unemployment in South Africa, is based on a weak empirical foundation” 
(2006:32).  
Moreover, even if increasing real wages were the cause of low employment growth, the 
fact that initially the wages of blacks were so low relative to whites implies that wage reduc-
tion can be no solution (2006:27) – the cure need not and cannot be the reverse of the cause, 
given initial discrimination and inequities in remuneration. (This issue seems to be their main 
concern.) The real wage reduction required to make a meaningful impact may also be very 
large. They estimate that to halve unemployment may require an average real wage reduction 
of almost 40% (2006:33).    64
In explaining low employment growth in South Africa in the recent past, they also point 
to the constraining effect of GEAR-based macroeconomic policy stringency with regard to 
growth and employment creation. This view, like other focal points of their analysis, proba-
bly puts them at odds with most of the contributions in this cluster, including IMF and 
OECD official reports (see below). 
 
(f)  Official reports from local and international organizations  
The public macroeconomics debate – dominated by private sector rather than academic 
economists – is strongly influenced by country reports from foreign institutions such as the 
IMF and the OECD. Locally the CDE is an active producer of similar reviews.  
Being more policy oriented, the reports often provide less detail regarding theoretical 
framework and analysis. However, usually one can deduce the basic understanding of the 
nature and causes of unemployment (and poverty) and one can characterize the approach. 
Given their influence on the public debate, characterising these are important. They all 
belong to the growth-oriented macro-economics sub-discourse. 
The official country reports from the IMF and the OECD generally address unemploy-
ment and labour market issues as part of a package of largely macroeconomic findings and 
proposals. Often there is limited reporting of the research itself. What is possible and rele-
vant here (also see figure 6), is to recognise typical themes (italicized below). For example, in 
the 2007 IMF country report (IMF 2007), we find the following: 
… with inflation risks on the upside, a tightening of monetary policy could be needed … 
remaining committed to the flexible exchange rate regime … maintaining a neutral fiscal 
stance and lower rate of government expenditure growth … further trade liberalization … the 
revision of labour market regulations and practices that limit job creation … initiatives to 
address income and wealth disparities. 
The 2008 OECD country report on South Africa highlights the importance of growth in 
labour productivity. On the extent and persistence of unemployment, it points to labour 
market rigidities in the form of high firing costs, the potentially negative labour demand con-
sequences of strong trade unions (being mainly focused on employed workers), and sectoral 
minimum wages. Lastly, it notes the possible disincentive effects of social grants on labour supply. 
The 2010 OECD report focuses on issues such as:    65
  Wage determination mechanisms (and sectoral extension of wage bargains, which causes wage 
inflexibility);  
  Bottlenecks in employment protection regulation;  
  The regulatory environment and increasing competition 
  Reducing direct government influence on the economy;  
  Monetary stability together with fiscal sustainability while  
  Reducing the real exchange rate to facilitate export-led growth  
  Government must “make the trade-offs between wages, employment and unemploy-
ment clearer to social partners”. 
The italicized phrases denote sentiments typically identified, in the public debate, as elements 
of the so-called Washington Consensus – and typify institutional advice given to the South 
African government after 1994. They echo sentiments found in the employment-through-
growth discourse cluster (or vice versa). The labour components focus on rigidities caused 
by regulations and labour unions. 
Many of these sentiments also are echoed in the views of private sector economists on 
unemployment and poverty. An organisational example is the Centre for Development and 
Enterprise (CDE), a business-oriented think tank which publishes roundtable reports on key 
issues. The context of its contribution is the growth-versus-redistribution debate. It suffices 
to quote some statements from its 2010 Roundtable (CDE 2010:34-40): 
  “The depth of poverty in South Africa is a major challenge. Poverty cannot be 
reduced without high and sustained rates of economic growth. 
  “Inequality in South Africa cannot be ignored, but it is not the same thing as reduc-
ing poverty. Rapid growth to address poverty might increase inequality in the short 
term. 
  “Increased public spending on redistributive policies is not only unsustainable, it will 
have adverse effects on our growth potential.  
  (W)e should learn from the impressive performance of many countries in the 
developing world. This means we should focus as single-mindedly as possible on 
adopting and implementing policies that will maximise sustained economic growth. 
‘Going for growth’ will pay off in far higher levels of national income and faster ex-
pansion of formal employment, with more and more people being drawn into the   66
formal wage economy and the consequent lifting of millions of people out of pov-
erty.  
  “Instead of seeing their human capital corrode through unemployment, millions will 
obtain real workplace experience, on-the-job training, and the psychological and 
cultural attributes needed to become more employable. These are enormously im-
portant consequences of expanding employment.  
  “We are not saying that inequality and poverty should be ignored for the sake of 
growth. We are arguing that rapid economic growth has a proven capacity to address 
large-scale poverty and, in time, inequality. It is the only sustainable approach.. 
  “South Africa needs … high and sustained economic growth, and a massive increase 
in the number of formal sector jobs. Nothing else will do.”  
 
8.  THE THIRD DISCOURSE: AN OVERVIEW 
 
Although all three discourses will be discussed together in the concluding section, it is useful 
to take stock at this stage. 
 
8.1  The basic macroeconomic discourse 
 
These contributions define, capture and characterise a broadly macroeconomic discourse on 
unemployment in South Africa. Diagrammatically the two sub-discourses in cluster 3 can be 
depicted as in figure 5. In contrast to clusters 1 and 2, there is limited overlap between the 
sub-discourses. What they share, is an singular focus on the formal sector. 
 In our meander we have moved from the right- to the left-hand side of the diagram. We 
started, in cluster 3A, with a few contributions that focus directly on unemployment. They 
implicitly or explicitly work in a paradigm that accepts the prevalence of rigid, non-market-
clearing prices and wages. We encountered evidence that the long-run rate of unemployment 
(which could be called the NAIRU) is and has been affected by labour market and other 
shocks, and that unemployment at a macro-level has not been reverting to a stationary long-
run equilibrium – there are signs of hysteresis in the unemployment pattern. Cyclical un-  67
employment was seen to be affected by cyclical output, as captured in a significant Okun 

























Moving to cluster 3B was quite a transition. This cluster, which dominates the larger 
macro discourse, reflects an almost exclusive focus on economic growth and the production 
side of the macro-economy – and on employment rather than unemployment. Thus, at an 
aggregate level it deals with the demand for labour. Except for the contribution of Pollin et 
al (2006), this cluster mostly works within the paradigm of competitive markets and flexible 
prices and wages that clear markets (implying that unemployment essentially is voluntary).  
One theme is that an abnormal labour absorption capacity and performance of the for-
mal economy has not been a cause of increases in unemployment – while, equally, implying 
that formal sector growth can only lead to a limited absorption of labour (given the average 
output elasticity of employment of approximately 0.5). This must be a central element of any 
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Another theme is sectoral shifts as the cause of unemployment, e.g. sub-par manufac-
turing growth as against strong tertiary sector growth. 
Recurring themes are the constraints placed on growth due to distortions in factor mar-
kets, that labour market legislation/regulation cause wage rigidity which prevents labour 
markets from clearing and resolving the unemployment problem, and that excessive real 
wage growth is a major cause of declining formal sector employment (with Pollin et al again 
the exception). 
The significant negative real wage elasticity of the demand for labour is a major focus. 
The message is unequivocal: one cannot analyse and understand unemployment in South 
Africa without talking about the real wage elasticity of the demand for labour. 
We also encountered, from international organizations, unemployment diagnoses in 
terms of distortions – caused by government intervention such as minimum wages and per-
haps also social grants, wage bargaining systems and labour unions – and the implicit identi-
fication of a lack of trade liberalization, exchange rate flexibility, prudent monetary policy, 
strict fiscal discipline, etc. as potential contributors to inadequate employment growth. The 
meander ended at strong calls for economic growth (and consequent formal sector employ-
ment growth) being the only solution for unemployment, large-scale poverty and, in time, 
inequality – despite the findings on limited labour absorption noted above.  
The weary meanderer will realize that she is on a mountain far removed from some 
others in the landscape and has travelled a long way, crossing many valleys, even gorges. 
 
8.2  The more complete diagram: filling in some empty spaces  
 
Figure 6 shows a more complete macroeconomic discourse diagram. It now also shows oft-
encountered South African policy themes arranged around the bold-text themes to which 
they relate. Many of them have been touched upon in the discussion. 
The bottom-right quadrant shows certain empty spaces in the debate. A large part of the 
macroeconomic discourse diagram (the right-hand half) is almost void of actual research in 
South Africa. In contrast, a significant part of the international discourse on unemployment 
is situated in the context of macroeconomic models of aggregate supply and demand, and 
macroeconomic equilibrium or disequilibrium. The concepts of long-run aggregate supply 
and long-run unemployment – in contrast to short-run aggregate supply and short-run or   69
cyclical unemployment, in conjunction with aggregate demand behaviour – are central to this 
debate. Much work has gone into explaining diverse experiences across countries regarding 
unemployment, e.g. in OECD countries, using models that include elements such as sticky 
wages and prices, persistence and hysteresis, search and search frictions, matching problems, 
and so forth.
54 However, in South Africa almost no such macroeconomic research has been 
done.  
Figure 6  
The complete macroeconomic and macro-sectoral discourse 



























Thus, the diagram is completed by showing the main theoretical approaches found, e.g. in 
teaching programmes, at departments of Economics at South African universities:  
                                                 
54 The 2010 Nobel prize for Economics was awarded for work by Mortenson and Pissarides (and 
Diamond) in this area, while Blanchard has published extensively on these topics (Blanchard 2005; 
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  New Keynesian macroeconomics (i.e. rigid wages, non-clearing labour markets; insider-
outsider models
55; slow adjustment back to NAIRU due to e.g. hysteresis; both cyclical 
and long-run unemployment recognised as problems; demand management can impact 
on cyclical unemployment); 
  New Classical macroeconomics (i.e. flexible wages, clearing labour markets; rapid adjust-
ment back to NAIRU; cyclical but not long-run unemployment recognized as a problem; 
no systematic demand management to counter unemployment necessary or acceptable);  
  Real Business Cycle theory (i.e. models of equilibrium unemployment; flexible wages and 
market clearing; no deviation from NAIRU; neither cyclical nor long-run unemployment 
recognized as a problem; all unemployment optimal; no stabilisation policy acceptable). 
These approaches have very different views on the nature of unemployment – compare the 
generic views on whether unemployment is voluntary or involuntary (right-hand column) – 
and on the speed of adjustment back to NAIRU. They also differ substantively on macro-
economic policy regarding unemployment, inflation and the business cycle. 
The work found in cluster 3A relate to the first of these theoretical approaches, i.e. the 
New Keynesian paradigm. Much of cluster 3B is related to, or influenced by, the paradigm 
of the New Classical Model and perhaps also Real Business Cycle theory. 
 
9.   THE COMPLETE LANDSCAPE: AN ANALYSIS  
 
9.1  The complete unemployment discourse landscape  
 
On the basis of this survey and meta-analysis, it has been suggested that the various South 
African research contributions related to unemployment can be clustered into three main 
discourses, but also some sub-discourses – five major or sub-discourses in all. Diagrammati-
cally they can be mapped as in figure 7. As before, shading and bold text indicate the main 
areas and topics discussed – the ‘mountains’ in the landscape. The top half shows the two 
main discourses identified in the first paper, and the bottom half the discourses of this 
paper. Labour market analysis – and the fundamental distinction between flexible and sticky 
                                                 
55 Michie (2003:19-20) outlines how labour market segmentation is integral to the NAIRU approach.   71
wages, or between clearing and non-clearing markets – appears to be the hub where all the 
discourses seem to come together (and diverge). 
Whilst one can meander from one topic or cluster to the other seemingly without much 
of a break., the discourse landscape has proven to be very diverse. Various clusters, assump-
tions and themes constitute unmistakeable features in the landscape, as do differences of 
emphasis – as well as deeper divisions. The generic views on the nature of unemployment 
(right-hand column) provide a snapshot view of the diversity.    72
Figure 7 
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Looking back over the landscape, a number of progressions or transitions become 
apparent:  
  From the aggregate to the sectoral, to the labour market, to the household and to the 
individual.  
  From the formal to the (segmented formal-and-) informal, to the survivalist.  
  From employment to unemployment to inequality to poverty.  
  From GDP growth to labour earnings to household inequality to individual deprivation.  
Some are minor transitions, others traverse severe fault lines in the discourse landscape. 
 
9.2  Three discourses, three worlds?  
 
Our main questions are the following. Is there an integrated, cross-informed debate on un-
employment and poverty, or do we have three worlds and three very different discourses – 
each with its own paradigm, theoretical framework, techniques, language and body language? 
Is there communication between the different clusters, the different discourses – or are they 
analytically blinkered and ‘polaroized’,
56 closed to insights from another discourse, another 
‘world’? 
The meta-analysis above suggests a significant degree of separation, although less in 
some cases. It appears that the two poverty-and-development sub-discourses (clusters 2A 
and 2B) are relatively close, and in turn are not too far from those in the labour market dis-
course (cluster 1) – although there are important differences relating to both content and 
methodology. However, there appears to be significant divide between these two discourses 
(clusters 1 and 2) and the macro discourse (cluster 3) –  which in itself is quite divided. 
Despite the micro-macro split, discourses 1 and 3A have similar views on the operation of 
markets.  
In a sense the micro-macro divide merely results from a particular theoretical perspective 
– an aggregate, macro perspective cannot but lose some details, and a micro perspective 
must purposefully restrict sight of the macro picture. But there may be more to it, as re-
vealed by the South African contributions (see below).  
                                                 
56 Polaroid sunglasses filters unpolarized sunlight by only allowing light in one dimension to pass 
through, filtering out other dimensions.   74
 Do the three discourses provide a coherent picture of unemployment? Consider the 
following layered characterizations (perhaps over-simplified) of the dominant approaches: 
 
Three analytical perspectives on unemployment:  
Macro:  Looking across and down from the top, searching for aggregate patterns.  
Labour: Busily trying to understand labour market mechanics and dynamics.  
Poverty:  
Poverty-inequality:     Looking at the inequality between top and bottom.  
Poverty-marginalisation: Looking  at the bottom, and up from the bottom. 
 
Three views of unemployment:  
Macro:  Unemployment (and low employment growth) primarily is due to a lack of eco-
nomic growth and perhaps some sectoral shifts – aggravated by labour market 
inflexibilities. (The focus is on the demand for labour at the aggregate or meso 
levels.) 
Labour:  Unemployment is the main problem as such, is a  labour market problem and 
occurs primarily due to labour market factors, segmentation and worker char-
acteristics. (The focus is on the supply of labour, at the micro level.) 
Poverty: Unemployment is a serious problem, but part of a larger problem of inequality, 
structural and chronic poverty as well as powerlessness and underdevelopment 
(which also undermine access to labour markets). (The focus is much broader 
than  labour demand or supply.) 
 
Some generalised impressions can be formulated, with the usual risks. Most macro-econo-
mists in South Africa do not seem to be very bothered with the implications of the messy 
details from labour, household and poverty studies – or with the significance of findings 
from such studies for macroeconomic analysis. At most they will mention a couple of 
empirical findings from labour market analysis. Their theme is: “High growth (and lower 
wages) will lead to higher welfare, more employment and more income for all, including the 
poor” … as long as labour markets are flexible and allowed to clear. 
Most labour market analysts and inequality analysts are not bothered with either cyclical 
issues, shocks or long-term growth issues, or the impact of variables such as exchange rates,   75
budget deficits and interest rates, or the importance of the wage elasticity of labour demand. 
“Whatever the growth rate or business cycle phase, the complex functioning of the labour 
market causes unemployment and inequality”. While they do focus on long-run unemploy-
ment, they are not much interested in the macro question of variations in the rate over time 
– or the issue of hysteresis. Neither are they much interested in the details of poverty and 
marginalisation analysis (although there are some exceptions). 
Poverty-marginalisation analysts similarly are not interested much in labour market 
analysis, or the wage elasticity of labour demand, or economic growth or economic cycles, 
since none of these capture or recognise the powerlessness of the unemployed poor. “What-
ever the growth rate or business cycle phase, the poor, marginalised, powerless and un-
employed do not benefit much from the economy.” 
The extent of the segregation, or even isolation, between discourses is nowhere more 
apparent than in the references. A scan of the references of the key papers in the various 
discourses reveals a virtually complete absence of cross-referencing between the macro-
economic discourse and the other two discourses – and vice versa.
57 Even between the 
labour market and development-poverty discourses cross-referencing is limited, although 
there is more of it – and it has been growing. However, the poverty-marginalization cluster 
(2B) is asymmetrically out in the cold: they engage with analysts in the poverty-inequality 
cluster (2A) (albeit critically, e.g. Du Toit 2005), but there appears to be little reverse 
engagement or referencing.  
Generally analysts prefer to engage with sources within a familiar sphere of knowledge, 
i.e. their own (comfortable?) discourse cluster and companions. There appears to be much 
‘polaroization’ in the unemployment discourse landscape.  
It must be added, though, that in some earlier comprehensive macro policy frameworks 
that were not reviewed explicitly, e.g. the MERG report (1993), there is an attempt to 
develop an integrated view – or at least a simultaneous treatment of issues. Similar 
comments apply to some of the early policy-oriented work of World Bank staffers such as 
Fallon and Lucas (1996) and Fallon and Pereira de Silva (1994). Other exceptions are, for 
example, the SALDRU Trade and Poverty Project of 2006, notably the contributions of 
                                                 
57 An exception is the two macroeconomic contributions in cluster 3A, i.e. Schoeman et al (2008) and 
especially Marinkov and Geldenhuys (2007), who situate their macro analysis with reference to key 
labour research findings. Hodge (2009) in cluster 3B has one reference to Kingdon and Knight.    76
Dunne and Edwards (2006), Pauw et al (2006) and Thurlow (2006) that analyse the impact 
of trade liberalization and resultant import-export shifts on employment and on the poor. 
 
9.3  Glaring gaps 
 
The sense of isolation extends to important topics. Several important instances of non-
recognition between discourses can be listed. 
1.  An important gap lies in the treatment of the formal economy, and the distinction 
between the formal and informal sectors. South African macroeconomists don’t seem to 
find informal sector employment – or linkages between the formal and informal sectors 
– relevant as a topic for theoretical or empirical analysis (perhaps due, inter alia, to data 
problems). The macroeconomic discourse focuses almost exclusively on the formal 
sector, where formal sector growth is seen as the ‘engine of employment growth’, 
absorbing (or ‘sucking in’) the unemployed and poor into formal employment. The un-
employment problem is implicitly equated to a lack of employment creation by the 
formal sector. Meanwhile 30% of the employed are in the informal sector and perhaps 
60% of employment is created there. And while wage flexibility/moderation/reduction 
in the formal sector is seen as a solution for the unemployment and poverty problems, 
many of the unemployed poor cannot transition even into the informal sector. Other 
discourses show that the informal sector and the second economy may be key to under-
standing unemployment and poverty. 
2.  The exclusive macroeconomic focus on the formal sector also implies a denial of 
segmentation and dualism. Both labour market and poverty analyses highlight evidence 
of segmentation and dualism (including poverty traps, both rural and urban). There is a 
focus on access, and barriers, to employment opportunities – inter alia from a condition 
of poverty. Analysts of marginalisation point out that, whatever the growth rate, the 
poor, marginalised and unemployed do not benefit much from the formal economy and 
are powerless to change their position. 
3.  Segmentation also implies that forms of profit-enhancing non-marketclearing wage set-
ting (e.g. efficiency wages) is common practice, precluding simple wage reduction (espe-
cially through government policy) as a solution. Ignoring these relegate some of the most 
important problems to the analytical backyard of macroeconomists. A search of the   77
macroeconomic discourse indeed shows that the terms ‘efficiency wages’ or ‘segmenta-
tion’ do not appear in any of the macroeconomic contributions discussed. 
4.  A search of  ‘wage elasticity’ in the labour and poverty/development discourses reveals a 
glaring absence of the term, even when reservation wages are discussed. This is surpris-
ing, since members of those discourses have been involved in estimating wage elastic-
ities.
58 On the macroeconomic side, the estimations of wage elasticities suffer from 
inadequate recognition of the problems of identification and estimation, and large vari-
ability in results. (The implications of segmentation for elasticity estimation is another 
challenge yet to be tackled.) The possible implications of an estimated value of -0.7 – e.g. 
that an almost 40% reduction in average real wages may be required to halve unemploy-
ment – also are not confronted.  
5.  The significance of an output elasticity of employment (or employment coefficient) of 
only 0.5 (approximately) for the potential impact of an ‘employment through growth’ 
strategy on unemployment is not taken aboard in most macroeconomic and macro-sec-
toral analyses.
59 At the same time, such a coefficient is not insignificant and the impor-
tance of economic growth in (formal sector) employment creation cannot be ignored. 
Some balance is required. 
6.  Given the ubiquitous role of the market paradigm in almost all the analyses, the uneven 
treatment of the supply and demand sides of issues is noticeable – and ironic. The labour 
and poverty discourses seem to focus only on supply-side restrictions in the labour 
market, with little attention to the labour demand side and aspects like absorption or the 
wage elasticity of labour demand. The unemployment-oriented macroeconomists (cluster 
3A) consider both aggregate supply and aggregate demand. The growth-oriented macro-
economic discourse (cluster 3B) approaches issues from the production (function) side, 
i.e. the aggregate supply side, and warns against a role for aggregate demand in relation 
to employment/unemployment. However, when this cluster digs down to the labour 
                                                 
58 A small exception occurs in later, policy-oriented papers of Kingdon and Knight (2005; 2007), 
which recognise the wage elasticity of labour demand as an issue – with reference to the impact of 
non-clearing wages in the formal sector – but only in a short reference to other studies. There is no 
own engagement between their own analyses and elasticity estimates. They do investigate a different 
elasticity, i.e. the wage elasticity of unemployment, in relation to the so-called wage curve (1999; 
2006). 
59 The same applies to the unemployment-growth elasticity value of -0.11 for 2001-2005, which im-
plies that very high GDP growth rates would be required to decrease the rate of unemployment sig-
nificantly, given labour force and productivity growth (Marinkov and Geldenhuys 2007).   78
market, it focuses on its labour demand side (e.g. wage elasticities) without much recog-
nition of the many supply-side constraints highlighted by the labour and poverty dis-
courses – apart from skills differences, which everybody recognise in some way. 
7.  There is little shared understanding or acceptance of major economic objectives. There 
are deep differences in the conceptualisation of the objectives of economic growth, of 
development, of inequality/redistribution. (a) The macroeconomic discourse narrowly 
tends to equate development with the growth rate of output and employment. Inequality 
is rarely mentioned (except by the CDE in its oppositional treatment of redistribution-
versus-growth). (b) The development and poverty discourses incorporate a broader con-
cept of development, but even they do not engage deeply with the various dimensions of 
human development and empowerment. Rather, the focus is on inequality and poverty 
(whether as monetary or multidimensional deprivation). Economic growth is rarely 
mentioned as an objective and is sometimes criticised as a ‘false objective’ that does not 
benefit the poor and exacerbates inequality. And, as noted earlier, much of the devel-
opment work gives limited attention to employment and unemployment.
60 (c) The labour 
market discourse does not refer much to growth or development, but rather highlights 
earnings inequalities and such problems.
61 
 
9.4  Deeper issues that obscure and fragment  
 
Why is it so difficult to reach, or listen, across subdisciplines and paradigms? Or, why are the 
contributions clustered in the way they are? 
Section 2 listed a number of factors that potentially segregate approaches to research on 
unemployment. Given the complete landscape diagram, one can imagine a number of grids 
that overlay the landscape and serve to obscure and fragment. Two important ones are an 
epistemological grid and an ideological grid. 
 
                                                 
60 This is a general problem in the contemporary development debate: employment and unemploy-
ment is not given much attention, also internationally (cf Amsden 2010:57-9; also Wuyts 2001). 
61 An exception, again, is the later, policy-oriented papers of Kingdon and Knight which do note “the 
need above all else to pursue economic policies to help raise the economic growth rate” (2008:321).   79
(a)  Epistemology and methodology 
The possibility of an epistemological grid is raised by an important question: Are there 
methodological or technical preferences in, or for, certain areas or approaches? For example, 
why is qualitative research only found in the poverty-marginalisation field? Do empirical 
techniques empower or constrain analysis? And what role do theoretical models play in the 
various discourses? 
These questions must be considered against the backdrop of the age-old tension between 
Empiricism and Rationalism in the social sciences. Modern economic research, with sophis-
ticated theory and equally sophisticated quantitative empirical techniques at its disposal, 
always has to steer an uneasy balancing act between these two methodological imperatives. 
The meander through the unemployment discourse landscape leaves the following general-
ised impressions: 
  In the labour market and poverty-inequality discourses, the tendency is to stress quantita-
tive empirical results, with theory playing a secondary role. Kingdon and Knight place 
the rigid-price, segmentation theory of Layard et al (1991) up front, but generally the 
research in that discourse displays a relatively empiricist orientation. The same applies to 
the poverty-inequality cluster. Researchers in these clusters can almost exasperate one 
with their insistence on deducing even the most obvious conclusion through a most rig-
orous and detailed analysis of quantitative microdata, informed by detailed scrutiny of 
survey questionnaires, for example. In the process a larger paradigm or theoretical model 
often fades from view. Although the work implicitly is situated within a general, if modi-
fied, neo-classical view of labour markets, it is the data that speak loudest – in very 
quantitative and sophisticated tones (as determined by their empirical techniques). 
  In the poverty-marginalisation sub-discourse, a different relationship between 
theory/paradigm and empirical evidence is evident. Firstly, there is greater use of quali-
tative data to complement quantitative analysis of poverty. This, apparently, is to allow 
crucial but difficult-to-measure dimensions such as social power relations and marginali-
sation to be integral to the analysis. Secondly, the theoretical paradigm is less mathemati-
cally specified than in modern neo-classical economics. There is less adherence to the 
prescripts of High Theory. The approach also incorporates perspectives and insights 
from other disciplines such as sociology, history and political science. What matters for 
them is a theoretical framework that can accommodate and explain both the qualitative   80
and quantitative empirical realities of poverty and marginalisation. The form of the theo-
retical model (or empirical technique) does not dictate the form of data that is acceptable. 
But the broad theoretical paradigm is prominent (even dominant) in determining which 
types of data and phenomena are relevant for analysis. And the paradigm is not doubted. 
  The macroeconomic discourse also relies strongly on quantitative empirical findings. 
Nevertheless, it appears to exhibit rationalist tendencies. Given uneasiness at the empiri-
cist leanings of e.g. labour economists, at the macro-level one may feel equally uneasy 
about an unqualified willingness to use standard neo-classical models of labour markets 
(and the assumptions inherent in those models) – without explaining the choice or con-
sidering their applicability to the South African and a developing country context. In the 
dominant macro discourse (cluster 3B) it is noticeable how much of the analysis is 
couched in a self-assured, ‘commonly accepted’ paradigm and belief about economic 
growth and flexible markets. The paradigm is not doubted or tested. Moreover, the theo-
retical model – and its form – largely determines the type and form of data selected. In 
this sense it is less evidence-based than e.g. labour market and poverty-inequality analy-
ses. A related tendency appears when the neo-classical model is given a normative rather 
than positive (explanatory) role as the benchmark for economic performance and 
behaviour. Rather than the model’s explanatory power being tested against the facts, the 
facts are being tested against the model. The observation that ‘well-performing behav-
iour’ evidently conforms with the ‘dictates’ (actually equilibrium conditions) of a par-
ticular theoretical model then becomes grounds for approval of the behaviour. This 
strengthens the impression of a rationalist tendency. It is the model that speaks loudest. 
 
(b)  Ideology 
Not surprisingly, ideological differences assert themselves in the South African unemploy-
ment discourse. What is surprising, is that certain topical areas seem to be associated with 
particular ideological orientations – the ideological spectrum is not present everywhere. 
Those that engage with poverty and marginalisation (in the upper left-hand quadrant of 
the landscape diagram, see figure 7) generally are more sceptical of the optimality of market 
outcomes and growth, more sensitive to inequality and marginalisation, averse to the nega-
tive role of economic power, and more confident in the ability of government to rectify or   81
restructure the economy to achieve better outcomes. With a few exceptions,
62 those engaging 
with employment growth (rather than unemployment) in the bottom half of the diagram 
generally are more optimistic about the optimality of market outcomes and the general bene-
fits of growth, more concerned about growth than inequality, less sensitive to a negative role 
of economic power, more sceptical of government intervention and quite averse to govern-
ment restructuring of the economy. The bottom-right and top-left approaches are worlds 
apart in this ideological grid. 
It is striking that there appears to be almost no ‘market-sceptic’ economic growth con-
tributions (except Pollin et al 2006) and no ‘state-sceptic’ poverty-marginalisation contribu-
tions in the South African debate. Are there ideological preferences for certain conceptual 
approaches? More specifically, to which extent do persons with certain ideological orienta-
tions gravitate towards, for example, either macroeconomic analysis or poverty-marginalisa-
tion analysis – and why would that be? Which comes first: the preference for a certain sub-
discipline and problem area to be  analysed (resulting in the adoption of the dominant para-
digm or ideology of that discourse) – or the preference for a certain ideological orientation, 
e.g. being state-skeptical or market-skeptical, resulting in gravitation towards an area of 
analysis where the dominant discourse is ‘comfortable’? What role do epistemological pref-
erences play in these choices – or does ideology trump epistemology? The answers to these 
questions are beyond the scope of this paper – but one needs to be aware of them, at least. 
 
(c)  Other factors that divide 
Other dividing lines or ‘grids’ can be mentioned briefly: 
  An institutional grid: Institutional factors can be powerful in shaping, and dividing, 
an academic discourse, often unintentionally. It has been noted that much of the 
labour, development and poverty research is based at, and shaped by, a few univer-
sity research institutes (SALDRU, DPRU, SDS, PLAAS) and perhaps the World 
Bank and ILO. On the macroeconomic side, no such institutes for research exist. 
The IMF and OECD set the tone. Some macroeconomic unemployment research is 
done by private sector economists, mostly as issue-oriented ‘investigations’ with the 
actual research not reported in a reviewable way.  
                                                 
62 For example, Pollin et al (2006) and some of the contributors of MERG (1993).   82
  A publications grid often serves to divide an academic community: The question is 
where the contributions of the different discourses normally are published, or where 
contributors feel at home. Is there self-selection and/or editorial selection which 
confine certain discourses to certain journals or exclude certain types of contribu-
tions from certain journals? This question is complicated by journals that specialise 
in a sub-disciplinary area, e.g. labour economics or development economics – as 
against generalist journals such as the major South African economics journals 
(SAJE, SEE, SAJEMS) that could, in principle, publish output from all the dis-
courses. 
  A funding grid: The question is whether internal or external organizations and fund-
ing agencies that support research on South African economic issues such as un-
employment have preferred approach and research sites. Do their funding prefer-
ences perhaps direct or constrain the South African unemployment discourse? 
  A policy grid: Do the main economic government departments (Treasury, Trade and 
Industry, Economic Development, Labour, etc.) have preferred approaches and 
research units that they consult? Which economists are consulted on South Africa by 
the World Bank or the IMF? To what extent do such patterns shape or constrain the 
unemployment discourse? 
All these grids indicate that the question where the SA unemployment debate is, has – in 
addition to state-of-knowledge and ‘in-several-discourses’ answers – a locational, ‘in-several-
places’ answer. 
 
10.   FINAL CONCLUSION 
63  
 
Looking back at the road we have travelled, one dominant impression is the wealth of 
insights to be found in the variety of research contributions, in the different clusters, in the 
different approaches, in the different paradigms. Much has been produced with regard to 
causes, interactions, data, measurements and parameters. We know much more than 15-20 
years ago. Yet the unemployment and poverty problems in SA persist, with little apparent 
                                                 
63 To be read in conjunction with the conclusion of section 6 (with patience for some repetition).   83
impact from various policy initiatives using inputs from many respected researchers and 
research units.  
It has been demonstrated that the large number of research contributions on un-
employment in South African can be organised and clustered into a number of discourses sig-
nified by distinctive topics, approaches, vocabulary, models and data (inter alia). It shows 
that the South Africa unemployment discourse ‘landscape’ is spacious and varied, with many 
mountains and hills, some coherence, but also deep valleys/divides.  
Three major discourse ‘worlds’ were distinguished, with some sub-discourses. There is 
much evidence of researchers in particular discourses not engaging with research results 
produced in other discourses, and even being analytically ‘polaroized’ by their home dis-
course. Debate occurs within the discourses, but not much between them. 
These divisions reflect numerous divisive factors intrinsic to the scientific process, as 
institutionalised by universities, research institutes, academic journals, funders and policy-
makers – but also, emphatically, by epistemological and ideological forces or preferences.  
As a result, to a large extent the insights produced by researchers in the different dis-
courses often are fragmentary, unrelated, insular, partial or inconsistent – no complete 
coherent analytical picture is produced by the many findings. A reader or policy-maker who 
is restricted to one discourse is unlikely to garner a nuanced, encompassing picture of the 
complex problem of unemployment. 
 
10.1   What have we learnt: key analytical messages 
 
Can one indeed get an integrated understanding that is not inconsistent with the main find-
ings from the different discourses (barring impassable theoretical-ideological barriers)? From 
this wide-ranging survey and meta-analysis of all the discourses, the following major analyti-
cal conclusions can be distilled: 
1.  The South African labour market is characterised by segmentation, informal-formal and 
rural-urban dualisms, and segmentation within the informal sector (alongside subsistence 
and survivalist sectors).  
2.  The nature of such multi-segmentation and of the labour market linkages between seg-
ments – and factors enabling or disabling persons to transition to a better segment – may 
be critical to both unemployment and poverty.    84
3.  A range of factors – information, entry and mobility barriers, inter alia due to the condi-
tion of poverty as well as marginalisation – structurally inhibit job searching and entry 
into labour markets both from a condition of poverty and from one segment to another, 
e.g. from the informal sector into the formal sector, or from rural to urban labour 
markets. These factors intrinsically limit the reach and smoothness of the functioning of 
labour markets. 
4.  The issues cannot be separated I: One cannot analyse and understand South African un-
employment without talking about segmentation and about the informal sector and about 
entry and mobility barriers and about the impact of poverty conditions and about margin-
alisation. Likewise, one cannot consider marginalisation and chronic poverty without 
talking about labour markets and income-generating activities. 
5.  The issues cannot be separated II:  One cannot analyse and understand unemployment 
in South Africa without dealing thoroughly with   
(a)  the real wage elasticity of the demand for labour (= approximately -0.7), in particular 
the likely positive versus negative impact, on employment, of wage decreases and in-
creases respectively,  and  
(b) the output-elasticity of employment, in particular the important though also con-
strained impact, on employment and unemployment, of formal sector growth, given a 
value of approximately 0.5. 
6.  Pensions and social grants constitute a critical policy nexus that links poverty-
marginalisation, inequality, labour supply, (un)employment and macro-fiscal considera-
tions. Complex incentive and disincentive effects may be present. 
7.  The impact of education on poverty, inequality and unemployment respectively may be 
dissimilar and complex to unravel. Education only appears to have a significant impact 
on (un)employment once working-age persons have a matric qualification or higher.  
8.  Gender, race, age and generational aspects influence, in complex ways, the causal 
relationships surrounding issues such as vulnerability, job search, migrancy, grants and 
education. These aspects need careful, nuanced analysis. 
9.  There are indications of a bidirectional causality between unemployment and poverty:  
unemployment causes poverty, but in turn the condition of poverty contributes to 
unemployment and its persistence. The implications of such a causality for policy to 
facilitate access of poor people to labour markets can be very important.   85
10. This may contribute to the observed phenomenon of unemployment hysteresis in South 
Africa – that the long-run equilibrium level of unemployment is not stationary and 
mean-reverting, but may shift permanently when subject to structural shocks or relevant 
forces. 
These are not meant to constitute a comprehensive integrated analytical picture, but they 
capture aspects central to such a picture. There is much to learn from ‘other’ discourses, and 
it would appear wise for anyone active in a discourse to be very open to learning from 
another cluster (or discipline). 
 
10.2   Analytical and research challenges 
 
The key messages, and the gaps identified above, pose the following kind of questions to 
researchers and policy-makers:
64 
  Can a macroeconomic analysis of employment and unemployment proceed legitimately 
without engaging with, and incorporating, the information, search and access problems 
caused by poverty and various segmentations? Or the broader implications of being in a 
developing country, of dealing with human and societal development?
65 
  Can an analysis of growth, and constraints on growth, not take account of the implica-
tions of segmentation, poverty conditions and marginalisation for the assumed free flow 
of labour into a formal sector with flexible labour markets? 
  Can a poverty-oriented or inequality-oriented analysis of unemployment and wages pro-
ceed legitimately without engaging with, or incorporating, the presence, nature and 
implications of a negative wage elasticity of the demand for labour (assuming that the 
elasticity can be properly estimated, also in a segmented market context)? Or the relative 
importance of formal sector growth? 
  Can marginalisation analysts and anti-poverty policy designers – and inequality analysts 
and macroeconomists – continue to take little notice of the impact of cyclical or other 
                                                 
64 The landscape of the policy discourse is not exactly the same as the research discourse, of course – 
although they will be related. Analysing and depicting the policy discourse landscape is a separate 
project. 
65 A South African macroeconomics textbook that is explicit in its attempt to integrate some realities 
of poverty, development, involuntary and structural unemployment into the supply side of its model, 
is Fourie and Burger (2009).   86
‘macroeconomic’ shocks and policy steps on the vulnerable and the poor – particularly if 
there is hysteresis, which could significantly prolong the impact of shocks on employ-
ment?
66 
  Can a growth-oriented employment analysis (or growth strategy) proceed legitimately 
without simultaneously dealing with the constrained employment-creation capacity of 
formal sector growth and the intrinsically linked worlds of informal production and 
employment, various types of subsistence activities and marginalised poor people? 
  Can labour unions continue to insist that macroeconomic policy measures – e.g. interest 
rate and exchange rate policy – should shoulder the burden of explaining and resolving 
unemployment (in conjunction with to industrial strategies to promote labour-intensive 
manufacturing)? 
If such questions are not addressed, the South African unemployment debate is likely to 
continue to be divided and intrinsically blinkered by separate discourses. It is highly unlikely 
that one discourse can provide the analytical insights and policy options necessary to devise 
measures and policies that could lead to a significant reduction of unemployment (and 
poverty) in South Africa.  
Finally there is the overarching question whether we adequately integrate the developing-
country context of South Africa into our analyses of unemployment. While unemployment is 
the main challenge in the labour context, the relationship between labour market issues and 
broader human and societal development issues poses a much larger challenge, and may 
indeed be the biggest gap. In each and every discourse one can ask: does this analysis deal 
with the development context in a satisfactory way? While such a gap may be more visible in 
typical macroeconomic analysis, it may be true of the labour market analysis as well – and 
even of the development cluster. The point is not that researchers may be insensitive to 
developmental issues. It is that the kinds of questions asked, the theoretical models used, the 
modes of analysis chosen and the data used/available are not necessarily suited to integrating 
the developing-country context.  
Approximately ten years ago, Fields (2000:56) urged South African researchers to 
develop a labour market model that properly incorporates the main stylized facts of our 
situation: 
                                                 
66 Pauw et al (2006) is an example of how the impact, on the poor, of changes in imports and exports 
due to trade liberalization can be analysed (via impacts on employment).   87
“Clearly, the right model is not the competitive labor market model – wages are not set by 
supply and demand. Nor is it an integrated labor market model – there is much too much 
labor market segmentation for that. … The least bad fit comes from the crowding model – 
those who cannot get formal sector jobs crowd into the informal sector, depressing earnings 
levels there – but that doesn’t fully fit either because of South Africa’s large volume of open 
unemployment. Thus an overall vision of how the South African labor market works and 
how the various components link together remains both a puzzle and a challenge.” 
Despite much research and analysis, that challenge has not been overcome. This paper 
broadens that challenge to the achievement of real integration between such a labour market 
model and both macroeconomic and development/poverty/inequality/marginalisation 
analyses and insights, in the context of a developing country. 
Such integration is of specific importance for policy making. While individual researchers 
or research institutes must have the academic freedom to focus on a specific angle, for the 
policy-maker there is no such luxury. No matter how much research work is available to 
dissect a problem, in the end the policy-maker must design and implement policy in a real 
world full of non-abstracted richness, complexity and messiness. This is particularly true for 
the fiscal authority (Treasury), where all government programmes come together in one 
budget – and of course the central government executive (Cabinet). 
Tackling the challenge will require a willingness from economists and policy-makers to 
listen across divides, talk outside sub-disciplines, disciplines and comfortable discourses, and 
engage without ideological or epistemological prejudice, preconceived ideas or labelling.  The 
intrinsic complexity of the phenomenon of unemployment, embedded as it is in so many 
societal relations, institutions and dynamics, demands nothing less. 
The conversation must begin.  
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